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ABSTRACT
This study argues that certain socio-political and educational systems enhance the 
effectiveness of student protests. Using social movement theory, I derive a model that 
explains the relationship of these structures to the outcomes of student activism. I then test 
the model’s accuracy by analysing cases of student protest in Québec, California, and 
Mexico. Protests are shown to be more successful in societies with centralised education 
systems that institutionalise student participation, and in societies that define students as an 
elite, politically-efficacious, unified group. By implication, student protestors face more 
barriers to success in California than in either Québec or Mexico.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
“American student activism has never constituted an active 
threat to the stability of the political system- not even during 
the dramatic protests at the 1968 Democratic Convention or 
immediately after the events of the Cambodia invasion and the 
shootings at Kent State in 1970. This contrasts sharply with the 
student movements in other countries.”
-Philip G. Altbach,
Student Politics in America, 19731
Students around the world are notorious for organising powerful protests. They have 
toppled governments, changed laws and determined national and foreign policy in countries 
as diverse as France, Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria, and Japan. However, while the 
phenomenon of student activism is not uncommon in North America, social historian Philip 
Altbach notes that American student activism has never significantly changed the national 
political system, nor even been effective at reforming university policy and shaping higher 
education.2
Why this is the case is unclear, particularly given the numerous protests organised by 
American students this past century. Studies of student protest have been very thorough at 
charting historical trends in student activism, analysing the events and circumstances that 
lead to student dissent, and detailing the psychological characteristics of student protestors 
themselves, but very few researchers have asked questions concerning the variables that 
encourage protest success. 
Many studies have noted this gap in the literature: Seymour Martin Lipset wrote as early 
as 1970 that “relatively little attention has been paid to the role of the student as a dynamic 
force in educational and political change. Students have, of course, been studied frequently as 
1
 Philip G Altbach. Student Politics in America: a historical analysis. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1973), 4.
2
 Ibid., 5.
subjects by social psychologists.”3 Despite many similar observations by other student protest 
researchers, this omission continued due to the fact that student activism is often depicted a 
form of hooliganism by the media and university administrators. Much of the literature on 
collective action and social change therefore excludes the study of student protest in favour 
of longer-lasting activism by organisations that produce more detailed records of their action. 
Furthermore, because classical theories of group insurgency view protest behaviour as 
apolitical, psychological phenomena, even more conventional forms of group activism have 
only recently been examined from a political perspective. As a result, the goals, tactics and 
outcomes of student protest have remained largely unstudied, particularly in terms of 
comparative analyses that would shed light on the different environments that shape student 
protest results. As A. Belden Fields notes, 
“We are sorely lacking in systematic studies of the comparative politics of student 
activism within American universities which focus on the incidence and conditions of 
success or failure that students have had in extracting concessions from university 
decision-makers.”4
This paper will attempt to fill this gap in the literature by examining the institutional 
frameworks that influence the outcomes of student protests. Analytically, these variables can 
be separated into environmental and movement-controlled variables. Environmental factors, 
also called institutional, context, structural or external variables, refer to the determinants of 
protest outcomes that reside outside the locus of control of protest participants. Their 
counterparts, internal or movement-controlled variables, are those pertaining to the 
organisational tactics and goal-setting of protest groups. These include protestors’ methods of 
framing their movements, the character and proportion of movement participants, the tactics 
they employ and the goals they set. In order to examine why protest outcomes vary so 
3
 Seymour Martin Lipset. “Students and Politics in Comparative Perspective.” In The Student Revolution: a 
global analysis. Edited by Philip G. Altbach. (Bombay: Lalvani Pub. House, 1970), vii.
4
 A. Belden Fields. “The Effects of Student Activism in Industrialized Countries.” In Social Reality. Edited by 
Harvey A. Farberman and Erich Goode. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1973), 292.
drastically across national boundaries, this project will exclude these variables and 
concentrate solely on isolating the environmental determinants of student protest.5
Understanding the factors that lead to successful outcomes for student protest is 
important for a number of reasons. First, studying the ways in which environments influence 
the results of group insurgency will help improve our knowledge about the causal processes 
involved in social and political change. While some theorists of contentious politics see 
group protests as deviant activities that cause social and political instability, many others note 
their potential to challenge the conservative tendencies of society and catalyse social 
progress. For example, Oberschall writes that social conflict “prevents the ossification of 
institutions and builds pressures for responsiveness and innovation.”6 Therefore, a better 
understanding of protest outcomes and their determinants can significantly improve our 
understanding of processes of social change. 
Second, it is important to examine student protest outcomes in particular because 
successful student activism can improve the democratic processes of society. Many scholars 
of student protest have observed that leaders of student rebellions often graduate to become 
the leaders of institutions that shape society.7 Furthermore, Califano has argued that when 
students are continually prevented from effecting change, they become alienated from the 
political system.8 In contemporary times, there has already been a disturbing increase in 
youth apathy in Canada and the United States demonstrated by low voter turnout and lack of 
5
 Of course, it must be noted that the distinction between movement-controlled and external variables is often 
very fuzzy because the environmental conditions in which protest occurs influence the tactics and goals 
adopted by movement participants. Nevertheless, it is still possible to identify the institutional factors that 
influence outcomes without precluding the possibility that they also play a role in forming the character and 
nature of the protest itself.
6
 Anthony Oberschall, in Donald E Phillips. Student Protest, 1960-1970: an analysis of the issues and speeches. 
(Lanham: University Press of America, Inc., 1985), 38.
7
 Joseph A. Califano. The Student Revolution: a global confrontation. (New York: Norton, 1969), 90.
8
 IBID.
civic engagement;9 this evidence indicates that the phenomenon of youth alienation may 
already be taking place today. Therefore, in order to assure that the youth of today become 
committed and active citizens of their community, it is essential to analyse the structural 
factors that may be preventing student protests from emerging and concluding successfully.
The thesis of this study is that institutional frameworks in the socio-political and 
education systems of different countries shape the outcomes of student protest. Social 
movement theory indicates that influential frameworks include the social status of students, 
the history of student protest, educational governance structures, and opportunities to form 
political alliances. In order to assess the significance of these factors, this investigation 
employs a comparative case study analysis of three student protests in three countries: 
Canada, Mexico and the United States. Last spring, 230,000 Québec students protested 
against a proposal to cut university bursary funds, while six years ago 260,000 students in 
Mexico City went on strike in response to a government proposal to impose tuition at the 
National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM). Both of these examples of student 
protest achieved many of their stated goals and will be utilised in this study as examples of 
‘successful’ student activism. From 1994 to 1996, thousands of Californian students at the 
University of California (UC) attempted to defend affirmative action policies and prevent 
their elimination, but the UC ultimately ended race preferences. The significance of the 
United States as a case study will therefore be as an example of a country where the socio-
political and education system impede student protests. It is possible to isolate the specific 
characteristics of these systems that influence student protest outcomes by comparing the 
institutional frameworks of these three cases. However, it is first necessary to create a 
9
 Michael D. Martinez. “Turning Out or Tuning Out? Electoral Participation in Canada and the United States.” 
In Canada and the United States: Differences that Count. Second Edition. Edited by David M. Thomas. 
(Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview Press Ltd., 2000), 221.
systemic way to approach the analysis. By reviewing the theoretical overlap of social 
movement and student protest literature, a set of hypotheses describing the relationship 
between institutional frameworks and student protest outcomes can be formulated. These 
specific hypotheses will then be tested using the three case studies described above.
No systematic study has of yet examined student protest literature as a subset of 
social movement theory, nor utilised models developed in social movement theory to explain 
cross-national differences in student protest outcomes. Focussing in such a way on the 
overlap between student protest and social movements is a useful endeavour as it organises 
what is otherwise a messy collection of unrelated accounts of student protest into distinct 
schools of thought. Furthermore, as cross-national analyses of insurgency outcomes are 
extremely rare, this study will make an important contribution to both student protest and 
social movement theory.
The benefits of employing a comparative case study methodology in order to isolate 
the environmental factors that determine student protest outcomes are twofold: first, using 
case studies makes it possible to avoid the use of rigid models of group insurgency that 
provide little information about protest outcomes to begin with, and certainly do not capture 
the intricate processes that contribute to student movement outcomes. Second, comparing 
different national cases makes it possible to isolate the conditions in each country that foster 
certain types of outcomes. 
This methodology does however limit the results of analysis in a number of 
significant ways. First, as one of the underlying premises of this project is that distinct 
national characteristics influence the effectiveness of student protests, many of the 
conclusions reached in this study will be limited to the three locations examined. On a related 
note, it is also possible that the conclusions reached in this study do not apply to all student 
protests even within the three countries examined; political, social and economic differences 
across states and provinces imply that student protestors face vastly different situations 
depending their locations within their own nations. However, notwithstanding the variation 
of institutional frameworks around the world and within countries, it is still likely that the 
factors identified and examined in this study would aid student protests in any nation. So, for 
example, the success of a student protest in a repressive state will depend in part on the same 
institutional frameworks as student protests in Canada, the United States and Mexico, 
although additional factors such as the state’s ability to use violence against protestors would 
mediate that influence. In that respect, the institutional frameworks identified in this study 
should be applicable in some respects to all student protests. Furthermore, this study can 
serve as an example of how future case-study comparisons of student movements in other 
countries can be conducted.
Finally, the three cases of protest analysed here were all attempts to prevent a change 
in government policy, and it may be that different institutional frameworks influence student 
movements with more revolutionary goals. Nevertheless, selecting cases with similar protest 
goals makes it possible to rule out the possibility that protest results differed due to variation 
in protest goals; comparing the outcome of a student movement designed to change the entire 
education system with the outcome of one that attempts to modify a specific policy would be 
fruitless, as revolutions are significantly harder to achieve. 
This study is divided into three sections. The following chapter provides an overview 
of both student protest and social movement literature in order to evaluate how these two 
bodies of research currently explain the outcomes of insurgency. Three schools of thought 
that explain contentious group politics are examined: classical theory, resource mobilisation 
theory, and political process theory. This chapter demonstrates that student protests can be 
analysed using many of the same models derived to explain social movement behaviour, thus 
making it possible to draw from social movement theory when attempting to explain student 
protest outcomes. Chapter 3 will then use the information gathered in this literature review to 
formulate a detailed set of hypotheses that describe the relationship between student 
movement outcomes and a society’s institutional frameworks. These variables, which 
represent the political opportunity structures available for student protestors to exploit in their 
respective nations, relate to the political status of students in society, the history of student 
protest, the governance structures of universities, and the social opportunities available for 
students to form alliances. Finally, Chapter 4 will explore cases of student protest in Québec, 
Mexico City and California in order to see whether the institutional frameworks identified in 
this study are accurate.
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
INTRODUCTION
This chapter will provide a summary of both social movement and student protest 
literature. It has two interrelated aims: 1) to locate student protest literature within social 
movement theory, and 2) to describe how these two bodies of research currently explain the 
outcomes of insurgency. To my knowledge, no systematic study has of yet examined student 
protest literature as a subset of social movement theory, nor demonstrated the parallels in the 
development of these two bodies of thought.10 Locating student protest literature within social 
movement theory is a useful endeavour as it organises what is otherwise a messy collection 
of unrelated accounts of protest into distinct schools of thought. Many of the foundational 
works on American student activism utilise a historical, narrative approach and frame protest 
as deviant, apolitical behaviour; in fact, students are often not considered as potential social 
movement actors at all because student identity, unlike a race, class, or gender identity, is 
temporary and not often united by common interests.11 Therefore, comparing accounts of 
student protest to theories of social movements will also help scholars of student protest 
evaluate the relative merits and explanatory powers of the accounts of student unrest 
described here. Finally, it will make it possible to apply theories of social movement 
outcomes to student protests in a logical and methodical way.
10 The one exception that I have encountered is a study by Nella van Dyke that applies social movement 
literature and a historical approach to student protests in the United States in order to analyse characteristics 
of different universities that make them more likely locations of student protest. Van Dyke then uses 
quantitative analysis to substantiate the hypotheses she draws from social movement theory. However, this 
study does not include a systematic comparison of student protest and social movement theory, nor does it 
utilise these theories to explain cross-national differences in protest behaviour or outcomes.
11
 Another reason cited to explain why so few scholars of group insurgency study student protest is that student 
movements often leave fewer records and documentation of their activism
In order to achieve the above-stated aims, this chapter will be organised according to 
the three dominant schools of social movement studies.12 Section 1 will present classical 
theories of social movements and will examine the student protest literature that fits into this 
perspective, as well as the classical view of movement outcomes. Sections 2 and 3 will 
follow a similar pattern in examining resource mobilisation and political process theory, 
respectively.
Examining social movement and student movement literature in their entirety is in 
this case necessary because very few studies examine the outcomes of student protest. In fact, 
this chapter will demonstrate that both social movement and student protest literature fail to 
adequately examine the institutional frameworks that influence the outcomes of student 
protest. This topic is rarely broached at all, and in cases where the external determinants of 
movement outcomes are examined they are generally not the focus of study. Therefore, a 
large gap exists in both student protest and social movement literature in terms of their ability 
to explain the environmental conditions that affect movement outcomes. This project intends 
to fill this gap, but in order to do so it is first necessary to examine social movement theory in 
depth and extrapolate from it a more coherent vision of the institutional frameworks that 
determine the outcomes of student movements.
I. THE CLASSICAL MODEL
A) Summary
Classical social movement theory sees movements as being inherently distinct from 
conventional politics and therefore peripheral to processes of structural social change: 
political elites and conventional governance possess the actual agency to create change, 
12
 An emerging fourth school of social movement literature, New Social Movement theory, has been excluded 
from this study because it deals with the identity of social movements and their relationship to culture and 
ideology. The outcomes of social movements studied in this paradigm concern cultural changes as opposed to 
political or socio-economic alteration; while interesting, this approach does not lend itself to the study of 
students as agents of political change.
while social movements can at most identify strains and tensions in the social structure that 
require resolution.13 Therefore, these theories focus on explaining the causes for the 
development of insurgency and largely avoid studying the mobilisation and resolution of 
movements. 
While theories of the genre are numerous and varied, each describes the emergence of 
social movements as following the same general pattern. This pattern forms the basic theory
of the classical model: a strain or social grievance causes a psychological disruption in some 
section of the population, and this results in the emergence of a social movement (see Figure 
1).14 Therefore, all classical theorists agree that the direct cause of a social movement is an 
individual’s disrupted psychological state, and that social movements are the result of some 
form of societal ill referred to as a strain or grievance.15
Figure 1- The Classical Model16
Disruptive
Structural Strain Psychological             Social movement
State
Theorists differ greatly in identifying the particular type of societal ill or grievance 
that triggers the psychological disruption. Commonly cited strains are industrialisation, 
urbanisation, rapid rise in unemployment, changes in voting patterns, or status 
incongruence.17 Likewise, descriptions of the specific change of psychological state also vary, 
but all theories view social movement participants as being different in some fundamental, 
dysfunctional way from the rest of society.18
13
 Craig J. Jenkins. The Politics of Insurgency: the farm worker movement in the 1960s. (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1985), xii.
14
 The classical model is therefore also referred to as the ‘grievances’ or ‘discontent’ model.
15
 Melvin G. Hall. Poor People’s Social Movement Organizations: the goal is to win. (Westport: Praeger, 1995), 
3.
16 Doug McAdam. Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970. (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1982), 7.
17
 IBID.
18
 Ibid., 4.
Because classical theorists do not view social movements as political processes, it is 
important for our purposes to note that most of these theories see little chance for movement 
success. Power resides in the hands of elites, and social movements are simply repercussions 
of a psychological disturbance among a sector of the population; social movements are not 
seen as agents of social change, and movement participants are often depicted as having anti-
social, destructive tendencies.
B) Classical views of student protest 
The classical perspective of insurgency is perhaps the model most manifested in the 
literature on student protest, although none of the authors referenced in this section make 
explicit reference to social movement theory. This is most likely due to the fact that classical 
theory was dominant during the sixties and seventies when the largest body of work on 
student protest was produced. It is also likely a result of the tendency to view youth as 
irrational, psychologically unstable actors, a tendency that fits very nicely with the classical 
view of social movement participants.19 The classical set of student protest literature mimics 
its counterpart in social movement theory by concentrating on the set of grievances that 
catalyse the outbreak of insurgency, as well as on the psychological characteristics of 
movement participants. The following is a brief overview of the main trends in this particular 
approach to analysing student protest.
Studies that assume that participants of student protests differ fundamentally from the 
general student population focus on detailing the demographic characteristics of protestors. 
Particular interest is given to their intellectual endowment, religious affiliation, family 
19
 Influenced by classical theory, many studies of student protest describe participants in derogatory terms. For 
example, in his analysis of student protest at Harvard University in the 1960s Steven Kelman wrote, “Most 
Americans see the extremists as pampered slobs gone amuck,” (see Kelman, Push Comes to Shove, 2) while
Bruno Bettelheim, a Professor at the University of Chicago, comments, “Very bright as they often are, 
emotionally some of them remain fixated at the age of the temper tantrum” (see Levine, Right on! ).
background and socio-economic status.20 A second set of classical studies focus on the 
grievances and structural strains that give rise to student protest. Most of these grievances 
can be classified as either forms of alienation with modern life, manifestations of the
generation gap between youth and the adult generation, or dissatisfaction with university life 
in general.21 Studies of Latin American student protest add anti-Americanism, antipathy to 
dictatorship, and revulsion at inequality to this list.22
These classical theories perpetuate denigrating portrayals of students and other 
movement participants. In so doing, classical theory seems to be taking a political stance that 
raises questions about its academic reliability; as Meyer and Rubinson note:
“A common political device is the attempted exclusion from ordinary consideration 
of the behaviour of other groups on the grounds that it is not properly political. Thus, 
student politics are reclassified by other members as not political, but as violent, 
disrespectful, immature, or irresponsible.”23
Ultimately, classical theory has very little to say on the subject of student movement 
outcomes because it focuses exclusively on their emergence and views them as apolitical 
processes incapable of creating structural change.
II. THE RESOURCE MOBILISATION MODEL
A) Summary
Resource mobilisation theory first emerged in 1977 as a direct critique of the classical 
model. Its main proponents, Mayer Zald, Roberta Ash and John McCarthy, criticised the 
20
 Molly Levin and John Spiegel. “Point and Counterpoint in the Literature on Student Unrest”. In The 
Dynamics of University Protest. Edited by Donald Light, Jr. and John Spiegel. (Chicago: Nelson-Hall 
Publishers, 1977), 36. See also Stevenson, “Higher Control in Institutions of Higher Education”, 79 and 
Bakke, “Roots and Soil of Student Activism”.
21
 See Stevenson, “Higher Control in Institutions of Higher Education”, 79 and Lipset and Altbach, Students in 
Revolt.
22
 Daniel Levy. “Student Politics in Contemporary Latin America”. Canadian Journal of Political Science. 14, 
no. 2 (Jun, 1981).
23
 John W. Meyer and Richard Rubinson. “Structural Determinants of Student Political Activity: A Comparative 
Interpretation”. 45, no. 1 (Winter, 1972).
underlying logic of classical theory by noting that grievances of one form or another are 
present at all times in every society, and therefore they alone cannot explain the emergence 
of social movements. The central claim of the resource mobilisation school is therefore that 
structural strains are a necessary but not sufficient cause of social movements, and that the 
catalyst that causes movements to emerge is in actuality an infusion of external resources that 
allow movement participants to mobilise.24  (See Figure 2)
Figure 2- The Resource Mobilisation Model 
Structural Strain Organisation     Social movement
Elite Resources
Central differences exist between resource mobilisation and classical theory. While 
classical theorists see movement participants as social deviants at odds with the rest of the 
population, resource mobilisation theory sees them as rational political actors who are trying 
to promote a political goal and who are aided and supported in this effort by outside elites.25
Also, resource mobilisation theory sees social movements as possessing the ability to create 
significant social change. Therefore, resource mobilisation theorists study the processes of 
mobilisation and resolution of movements while classical theorists for the most part do not.
This enormous broadening of the social movement field predictably led to the 
development of new ways of studying social movements. William Gamson notes that a 
completely new set of variables are highlighted by resource mobilisation theory. First, 
resource mobilisation theory studies the collection and aggregation of resources that cause 
movements to emerge. Second, it is assumed that resource aggregation and use requires some 
form of organisation, and therefore mobilisation theory focuses more directly on the structure 
24
 Hall, Poor People’s Social Movement Organisations, 6.
25
 Hall. Poor People’s Social Movement Organisations, 7.
and roles of social movement organisations.26 Third, outside elites play a crucial role for 
social movements, as they are the providers of the new resources that allow the movement to 
develop at a particular historical moment. Fourth, supply-and-demand analysis is often 
applied to the flow of resources in order to explain the emergence and decline of social 
movements. Finally, resource mobilisation theorists can conduct cost-benefit analyses to 
explain the incentives that cause individuals and organisations to become involved in a social 
movement. Because costs and benefits are determined by the structure of society and the 
activities of authorities, some resource mobilisation theorists also study environmental 
factors when they attempt to explain the emergence, continuation and resolution of 
movements. 27
B) Resource mobilisation views of student protest
Student protest literature that is inspired by resource mobilisation theory sees the 
emergence of student movements as the result of increases in resources. In analyses of 
student protests, these resources are normally described as either financial capital, human 
capital or increased free time. Furthermore, the shift in social movement theory from seeing 
movements as apolitical, ineffectual and primarily psychosocial is mimicked in student 
protest literature. For example, Meyer and Rubinson note, 
“A crucial feature of student political activity, largely overlooked, is that it is 
participatory behaviour and can be discussed and explained in much the same terms 
as such behaviour in other groups.”28
Adopting a resource mobilisation approach, Meyer and Rubinson posit that factors that 
endow students with resources increase student participation in movements. They define 
26
 McCarthy and Zald define a social movement organisation as “a complex, or formal, organization that 
identifies its goals with the preferences of a social movement or a countermovement and attempts to 
implement those goals.” (see McCarthy and Zald, Social Movements in an Organizational Society, 20).
27
 William A. Gamson. “Introduction”. In Social Movements in an Organizational Society: collected essays. 
Edited by Mayer N. Zald and John D. McCarthy. (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1987), 18.
28
 Meyer and Rubinson, “Structural Determinants of Social Movement Activity”.
these resources as increases in students’ personal skills and increases in their membership in 
groups and social systems, which presumably increase critical mass and therefore 
organisational capacity.29
Other writers who sometimes view student protest from a resource mobilisation 
perspective include Oberschall, Califano, and Van Dyke. Oberschall analyses student 
participation in movements from a “risk/reward perspective” that in actuality is a cost-benefit 
analysis of participation. He notes that student protest activity was low-risk in the United 
States until the Kent State incident; campus social control discipline was moderate and 
therefore for much of this period student protest participation was high and rewarding. From 
1970 on however, the risks of student protest escalated in terms of legal and economic 
consequences for participants; students’ career prospects could be jeopardised by protest 
participation, and some protestors faced prosecution. Therefore, following the 1960’s the 
rewards of activism diminished and so did the level of student protests.30
Califano employs a resource-based model to explain why certain students are more 
likely to join protests. He claims, “affluence is unquestionably a significant factor in student 
unrest.”31 Upper-middle class students are likely to participate in protest activity because they 
do not have to concern themselves with material worries, while part-time fifth and sixth-year 
students are likely to participate because they have more free time and resources in the form 
of increased experience with university political structures.
Van Dyke notes that the highest incidences of campus protest activity occur at large-
scale universities where there is a critical mass of students. This observation is indicative of 
29
 Ibid.
30
 Donald E. Phillips. Student Protest, 1960-1970: an analysis of the issues and speeches. (Lanham: University 
Press of America, Inc., 1985), 34.
31 Califano, The Student Revolution, 47.
protest being a function of human capital.32 Like Califano, she also notes the important 
contribution of non-students and part-time students often found in the vicinity of large 
schools; these individuals have additional time resources that allow them to participate in 
protest activity with greater frequency.33
C) Resource mobilisation views of outcomes 
Theorists have employed the resource mobilisation model to explain the outcomes of 
both student protests and social movements. However, due to its emphasis on organisational 
factors and resources, resource mobilisation theory often analyses movement outcomes by 
assuming a continuing level of resource support from elites and by looking only at 
movement-controlled variables. In The Strategy of Social Protest, William Gamson provides 
the most detailed analysis of the relationship between organisational variables and the 
potential for social movement success. Gamson defines success using two measures: the 
acceptance of challengers as legitimate claimants and the obtaining of new advantages for 
constituents.34 He finds that four movement-controlled variables help determine outcomes: 
groups with single-issue demands are more successful than groups with multiple-issue 
demands, the use of selective incentives is positively correlated with success, the use of 
violence and generally disruptive tactics is also associated with success, and, successful 
groups tended to be more bureaucratised, centralised, and unfactionalised. In addition to this 
primary focus of his work, Gamson also tested the role of context variables and found that 
these seemed to have less of an effect on the outcomes of the challenging groups.35
Although few theorists have examined student protest outcomes systematically, 
Farberman postulates a set of ideas about resource mobilisation variables inspired by his 
32
 Van Dyke, “Hotbeds of Activism”, 90.
33
 Ibid., 80.
34
 Marco G Guigni. “Was It Worth the Effort? The Outcomes and Consequences of Social Movements”. Annual 
Review of Sociology. 24 (1998), 376.
35
 Ibid., 375.
experience of the French student protests in 1968. He explains why successful student 
mobilisation is difficult to produce and sustain by noting that students as a group are 
deprived of material resources:
“Student status is of short duration, thus a consistent organisational base is lacking; 
students are young and short on political skills and experience; they lack financial 
resources, do not enjoy the full measure of civil rights accorded adults, have virtually 
no informal access to decision-makers, and offer no strategic services which can be 
withheld in strike action. From every point of view, students are weak on resources.”36
Farberman continues to explain that high levels of student revolt, while not due to material 
resources, are in fact due to resources of a human nature: 
“The students capitalised on the only resource they could depend upon- their own 
bodies. The students reacted to massively inept governmental policy by direct 
confrontation of officials. Officials reacted with force, students were beaten, non-
student segments of the population sympathised with them, and an incipient anti-
regime attitude began to crystallise.”37
Clearly, resource mobilisation theory largely ignores external determinants of 
movement success. Gamson’s study of movement outcomes in particular has limited research 
by focusing on variables of social movement organisations instead of on political factors and 
by cursorily dismissing context variables. Piven and Cloward argue that this exclusion is 
unfortunate as environmental political factors actually play a large role in determining 
movement success: their 1979 thesis stresses the importance of factors external to the 
movement itself and further contradicted Gamson’s findings by demonstrating how internal 
movement organising can be detrimental to movement success. Their study helped in part to 
inspire the final model of social movements that this paper will examine, the political process 
model. Like Piven and Cloward, political process theorists place a large emphasis on the 
importance of both internal and external factors in the determination of movement success. It 
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is by studying these external movement variables that this study hopes to contribute to the 
literature on student protests.
3. THE POLITICAL PROCESS MODEL
A) Summary
The political process model is an alternative to both the classical and resource 
mobilisation model. According to Doug McAdam, its founder, the theory seeks to explain 
insurgency as a result of factors both internal and external to the movement. Three main 
factors are cited: expanding political opportunities, indigenous organisation, and collective 
liberation.38 Political opportunities are similar to what classical theorists refer to as structural 
strains, however instead of merely causing a psychological disturbance among individuals 
these opportunities lead to collective liberation and organisation among effected groups.39
Political opportunity structures refer to the institutional structure, informal procedures and 
power configurations in the political context that influence movements.40
Alone, political opportunities are not sufficient to cause social movement emergence. 
However, in conjunction with the formation of organisations among the aggrieved population 
and the realisation of collective liberation, social movement formation becomes possible. 
Piven and Cloward explain collective cognitive liberation as the realisation by an aggrieved 
population that something can be done to change their condition and that furthermore 
something should  be done as the current system of power is unjust.41 However, cognitive 
liberation can only occur after an accompanying expansion of political opportunities and the 
development of a strong organisation have taken place because a ‘critical mass’ must be 
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reached in order to promote liberation.42 All three factors identified by the political process 
model are therefore interrelated. Furthermore, it is clear from its emphasis on these three 
factors that, unlike the preceding classical and resource mobilisation models, political 
process theory takes into account both socio-psychological and political phenomena.
Finally, McAdam is careful to point out that even in cases where the three main 
factors are present, social movement emergence is not guaranteed. The antecedent to these 
three factors is what McAdam labels ‘broad socioeconomic processes’. The fact that he does 
not elaborate on this important concept at all must be interpreted as a deliberate reminder that 
insurgency is both a social phenomenon dependent on psychological factors not easily 
defined or predicted, as well as a political phenomenon dependent on environmental factors.43
Therefore, social movements cannot be explained by any universal model or list of 
conditions because they involve a complicated mix of both political and psychological 
processes that are unique to any given situation. The political process model of movement 
emergence is illustrated in Figure 3.
Figure 3- The Political Process Model44
Political Opportunities
Socioeconomic Processes Cognitive Liberation         Social movement
Organisational Strength
B) The political process view of student protest
Cognitive liberation and political opportunities have been used to explain student 
protest emergence. For example, the idea of cognitive liberation is embedded in Meyer and 
Rubinson’s thesis that student political activity reflect the inclusion of students as a status 
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group in the social and political system: students are politically active in many Latin 
American countries because “the student status is almost everywhere defined, both 
structurally and symbolically, as one with distinctive standing in society and in the political 
system.” Moreover, this symbolic image of students provides them with the conviction that 
they hold political power;45 this analysis very closely mirrors the description of processes of 
cognitive liberation described by Piven and Cloward. 
Daniel Levy also employs a political process analysis to help explain why public 
universities in Latin America witness greater degrees of student protest than private 
universities. He argues that the lack of student mobilisation at private universities is due to a 
smaller political opportunity structure: “Most private universities are governed from atop a 
much steeper organisational hierarchy. Many are self-consciously patterned after the 
American model, purposefully and explicitly rejecting the Latin tradition of student 
participation.”46 He concludes that the most important determinants of student political 
activism are external variables not controlled by the students themselves: “Whatever role in 
shaping national policies one ascribes to student politics, an analysis of the 1970s clearly 
indicates that the shape of student politics is itself highly dependent on national policies.”47
C) The political process view of outcomes
Political process theorists see success as a continuation over time of the same mix of 
internal and external factors that caused the initial generation of insurgency.48 Therefore, 
factors that create political opportunities or aid in processes of cognitive liberation improve 
chances of movement success. Of the three sets of literature examined, political process 
theory has the most to say about external influences on outcomes.
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Guigni notes that studies about the environmental conditions that influence the 
outcomes of movements have thus far analysed two external factors: the role of public 
opinion and of political opportunity structures. Part of the goal of social movements is often 
to raise public support for their cause, and governments pay close attention to public opinion 
when making decisions; therefore, social movement analysts look at the way that social 
movements change social values to increase public sympathy, as well as how these changes 
in public opinion can subsequently help movements achieve their goals by making decision-
makers more responsive to their demands.49
Political opportunity structures refer to two external determinants of movement 
success: the system of alliances and oppositions to social movements, and the state 
structure.50 Guigni describes how powerful allies are necessary for successful mobilisation in 
the long run, and how opponents may influence the outcomes of social movements. 
According to this perspective, the effectiveness of social movements depends on their 
capacity to bargain effectively with allies and opponents.51 Multiple case studies of social 
movements demonstrate that the structure of the state influences outcomes: Jenkins examines 
American farm-worker insurgents and concludes that their success was due to a combination 
of sustained outside support and the disunity of the political elites during a period of political 
turmoil under a centre-left governing coalition.52 Piven and Cloward further identify the role 
of institutions that shape opportunities for action and limit its impact; they view the electoral-
representative system as a major factor mediating the political impact of institutional 
disruptions.53 Finally, Meyer and Rubinson demonstrate that student protest success is 
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determined in large part by the institutionalisation and regulation of the educational system at 
a national level.54
SUMMARY
This chapter has explained the central tenets of classical, resource mobilisation and 
political process theories, paying particular attention to how these perspectives view 
movement outcomes. It has also examined how student protest literature coincides with these 
social movement models, thus making it possible to draw from social movement theory when 
attempting to explain student protest outcomes. 
Two major findings stem from this review of the literature. First, student protests can 
in most respects be analysed in the same way as social movements. Despite the fact that 
many definitions of social movements involve an element of longevity, even student protests 
of short duration display the main characteristics of a movement: they pass through phases of 
emergence, continuation and resolution, and furthermore they each can be understood as 
evolving in response to a particular set of grievances, resources, organisational capacities, 
collective cognitive liberation and political opportunities.
Second, on the subject of movement and protest outcomes, most theorists agree that 
the same factors that lead to the emergence of group insurgency also lead to its perpetuation 
and contribute to its successful resolution. These factors can be separated into internal and 
external variables.55 External variables refer primarily to political opportunity structures and 
the development of cognitive liberation; in the case of student protest, these are determined 
by the education system and student status in society.
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The following chapter will draw on the theories and observations described in this 
review in order to derive a complete set of hypotheses that explain the environmental 
determinants of the student protest outcomes in Québec, Mexico and California. While the 
information gathered here will prove very useful to this attempt, it is clear that the 
institutional determinants of student protest outcomes have thus far been largely neglected in 
the literature: not one theorist systematically analyses the outcomes of student protests, to say 
nothing of the external factors that lead to success. This oversight probably relates to the 
relative lack of a corresponding theory in social movement literature; as Guigni notes, 
“research on social movements has usually addressed issues of movement emergence and 
mobilisation, yet has paid less attention to their outcomes and consequences.”56 As 
demonstrated, accounts of student protest mirror developments in social movement theory; 
therefore, it is unsurprising that these two gaps coincide.
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CHAPTER 3: THE EXTERNAL DETERMINANTS OF STUDENT PROTEST
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this chapter is to employ the information gleaned from social 
movement theory in order to formulate a set of hypotheses related to the institutional 
frameworks that influence student protest outcomes. Chapter 4 will evaluate the 
importance of the independent variables identified in this chapter by analysing the 
outcomes of student protests in three different political contexts: two successful cases of 
student protest, one in Canada and one in Mexico, and one unsuccessful example of 
protest in the United States. For the purpose of this study, protest success or effectiveness 
can be understood as an outcome in which social movement participants realise their 
primary aim: therefore, protests are either successful or not successful. This operational 
definition is the most applicable because this study seeks to understand the circumstances 
in which student activists can deliberately produce social change. Because all three cases 
of student protest clearly stated their goals and because the realisation of their aims can 
be easily observed, these cases lend themselves to such a binary definition of outcomes. 
Definitions of social movement outcomes that understand success as some variation or 
combination of goal achievement, movement strengthening, or unintentional effects are 
not as pertinent.
This chapter is divided into two sections. In the first section, hypotheses describing 
the relationship between protest outcomes and different socio-political and educational 
institutional frameworks will be explained. The second section will introduce the case 
studies that will be used to verify these hypotheses. If the institutional frameworks 
identified in this chapter are valid explanations of protest outcomes, then these variables 
should manifest themselves more in the Canadian and Mexican systems than in the
American system. To be sure, not all of the determinants of student movement outcomes 
can be examined in this study: the four that have been selected are those that were 
comparable across the three cases and that best explained the variation in outcomes.57
In order to identify these four variables, all three schools of social movement 
literature were considered. However, as each framework- classical, resource mobilisation 
and political process- focuses on different aspects of social movement emergence, 
mobilisation and resolution, they were not all equally useful in identifying the 
institutional influences of protest outcomes. For one thing, classical theory analyses only 
the grievances that catalyse the outbreak of insurgency. As will be shown in the 
description of the protests, the student movements in Québec, Mexico and California 
were all caused by one common grievance, namely the implementation of a specific 
policy that placed limitations on university access. However this identification of 
movement catalyst does not generate any hypotheses regarding protest outcomes.
Resource mobilisation theory highlights infusions of external resources that help 
protestors mobilise and sustain their movement. In the case of student protests, these 
resources come in the form of financial capital, human capital, and increased free time. To a 
large extent, these three variables are determined by the movement and not the environment 
in which protest occurs. For example, human capital and free time depends on the ability of 
protest organisers to encourage movement participation, the nature of the tactics they choose 
to employ, as well as the sharing of tasks within the movement. The importance of financial 
resources is also determined by the nature of the tactics employed, and while money can be 
donated by external protest supporters, student protests are largely dependent on the 
affluence of movement participants and the organisations they work through. Therefore, 
57 For a discussion of other unexamined possible factors, please refer to the summary and the conclusion.
although these three factors are pertinent influences on protest outcomes, it is difficult to 
measure them as effects of external institutional frameworks. For this reason, resource 
mobilisation variables are not central to this study. A discussion of their potential 
significance to the three cases of student protest can be found in Appendix A.
 Political process theory proves most applicable to this study. This school of social 
movement literature looks at the opening of political opportunity structures and processes of 
cognitive liberation that increase chances for movement success. It is clear from the outset 
that political process theory generates a larger set of pertinent variables than other social 
movement theories because of its focus on the wider political and cultural environment in 
which protest occurs. Variables that help explain student protest success according to this 
model are the role of student status and identity, the history of protest and political 
participation, the degree of openness of educational governance structures, and the 
availability and role of elite allies. The following section will describe these four variables in 
greater detail.
I. POLITICAL PROCESS VARIABLES
A) Variable 1: Student status
Hypothesis: An elite, politically-involved student identity aids student 
protests
Political process theory emphasises the importance of cognitive liberation as a 
contributor to protest mobilisation and strength. For students to be a successful challenging 
group, they must possess a cohesive sense of solidarity that stems from the development of a 
distinct student identity. Furthermore, this identity must be infused with a sense of political 
efficacy and competence in order to encourage protest participation.
Numerous studies of student protests have noted the importance of highly-regarded 
student status.58 This prerequisite is necessary for a number of reasons. First, a sense of 
community allows student leaders to mobilise their peers around a set of objectives because 
they can identify these objectives as important for students as a group.59 Second, the student 
identity is often identified with intellectualism and thus with a relatively high social status. 
This position allows students to appeal to the social and political values of other intellectuals, 
and in so doing form alliances with other groups in society.60 Third, the student identity 
typically has an inherently idealistic quality that is due in part to the elite nature of university 
students as well as to their youth; protest leaders often explicitly appeal to this idealism in 
order to mobilise students.61
Not only must student status be evolved and highly- regarded, it must also contain a 
sense of political efficacy. In their 1972 survey of student activists, Meyer and Rubinson find 
that political participation most often stems from a sense of competence rather than of 
despair or oppression.62  This observation is intuitively sensical: self-competence and a belief 
in self-actualisation among the student body is important in order to inspire protest, because 
defeatist attitudes would result in complacency and apathy.
The cohesiveness and character of student status varies across countries and can 
change with time. It is determined by such factors as the historical involvement of students in 
politics, the status of intellectuals, the political career opportunities of students and student 
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activists after graduation, political cultures of mass participation and civic engagement, and 
the existence of competing identities that lessen the importance of student status.
B) Variable 2: History of success
Hypothesis: Historical precedents of student political participation aids 
student protest
A historical precedent of student influence in governance aids protest primarily 
because such a history is necessary in order to create the politically-active and influential 
student identity that was just described. As Bakke and Bakke note, “the concept of what it 
means to be a student is built up out of the expectancies held by students…These 
expectancies are stabilised by popular, cultural, and historical reinforcements.”63
Furthermore, a history of successful protest and participation implies that contemporary 
student protestors will have a network of alliances and a repertoire of tactics that they can 
renew, and that the authorities they are challenging already view the students as an influential 
group that must be negotiated with and not ignored.64
Multiple student protest scholars have empirically demonstrated the importance of a 
history of activism. In her examination of American universities in the 1960s, Nella van 
Dyke finds that schools that experienced protest around one issue were far more likely to 
have protest around numerous other issues as well.65 She also found evidence that 
universities that experienced protest in the 1930s were more than four times more likely than 
schools with no history to experience protest activity during the 1960s.66
A second likely reason for the importance of a historical precedent of student political 
participation is the fact that activist subcultures may survive on college campuses over time 
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and thus aid in future student mobilisation. For example, van Dyke finds evidence that 
American students of the 1960s were influenced by activist subcultures that had endured 
among long-time faculty members and community locals since the 1930s.67 The survival of 
these activist subcultures means that student protestors can receive training in tactics, learn 
more about the administrative culture that they are challenging, and be acquainted with the 
history of activism on their own campus. Students from large university towns may have an 
easier time accessing these ‘social movement communities’ as many alumni and former 
student activists remain in the vicinity and because these schools are surrounded by a larger 
number of restaurants, cafés and clubs that encourage interaction between current students 
and these locals.
C) Variable 3: Educational Governance
Hypothesis 1: Centralised, public education systems aid student protest
Hypothesis 2: Institutionalised student participation in university governance 
aids student protest
Two qualities of the decision-making structure of university governance have been 
cited by protest scholars as important determinants of student activism: the level of political 
centralisation of the education system and the level of student participation in governance.68
Regulation by the national political system helps encourage the formation of a unified 
student status for two reasons.69 First, because all students are subject to the same 
examination schedule, course requirements, financial demands, and government policies, it is 
far easier to mobilise a larger number of students in a centralised system than in a 
decentralised one because a larger percentage of the total national student population is 
affected by policy changes. Second, a centralised, public education system also provides a 
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more concrete target for student protest, usually the national government or Ministry of 
Education, while decentralised systems have multiple levels of decision-making.70 This 
increases potential for protest success simply because there are fewer decision-making bodies 
that need to be influenced.
Furthermore, high levels of centralisation often come hand-in-hand with strongly 
institutionalised student participation: as Levy notes, “co-government has rarely found an 
institutional home in a private setting”71 because most private universities are governed by a 
Board of Trustees and have a more top-down organisational hierarchy than public 
universities. Therefore, countries with a centralisation of authority are likely to have a strong, 
centralised organisation of students at the national level as well,72 and this student union is 
ideally positioned to protest education policies and mobilise the entire national student 
population. 
Institutionalised student roles in university governance are important in and of 
themselves: for example, even in the highly-decentralised American education system the 
most notable examples of student activism occur at universities that promote student 
participation in university governance and civic engagement in society.73 This is perhaps 
explained by the fact that co-governance encourages students to perceive involvement in 
politics as both their right and responsibility. Thus, institutionalised student participation 
strengthens students’ political identity and aids in processes of cognitive liberation. It also 
provides direct access to the university decision-making structure and thus greatly increases 
the political opportunity structures available to student organisations and protest groups.
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D) Variable 4: Systems of alliances
Hypothesis: Institutionalised links to political allies aid student protest
Systems of alliances influence movement outcomes because outside allies increase 
the potential for the donation of resources to the movement, provide indirect access to 
decision-making bodies and reinforce the legitimacy of protest movements as political actors. 
This rationale applies strongly to student movements as well. Allies of student protests range 
from public political figures and intellectuals who provide moral support, to political parties, 
trade unions and other social groups who provide both financial support, access to decision-
makers and valuable political training.
Bakke and Bakke note that support from non-student groups bolsters the morale of 
student activists and occasionally also results in financial contributions to student 
movements.74 To be sure, this type of infusion of external resources can undermine a student 
movement by alienating student participants who oppose the ideology of these non-student 
groups, but in many cases public support from respected intellectuals or public figures 
creates widespread societal support for student protests, increases the chance that more 
students will join the movement, and diminishes the likelihood that university administrators 
will ignore student demands. In short, support from outside allies makes student protest 
appear “intellectually and morally respectable.”75
Furthermore, links between student activists and local or national political parties 
allow protestors to learn vital leadership skills: as Levy notes, “student leaders learn how to 
recruit, form alliances, exert pressure, make compromises and deal in the political capital of 
power.”76 Such alliances also encourage more students to participate in campus activisms, as 
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it is apparent that in such situations political talent and involvement may ultimately result in 
offers of employment or at the very least in character recommendations.77 Finally, Ian 
Weinberg and Kenneth Walker argue that structural links between student organisations and 
national political parties may help control extremist tendencies among student activists and 
thus create a wider support base for student movements;78 this observation applies to alliances 
with non-governmental community organisations and unions as well.
II. THREE CASES OF STUDENT PROTEST
The three cases of student protest that have been selected to establish the validity of 
these hypotheses occurred in Québec, Mexico, and California. In Québec, students protested 
from spring of 2004 to spring of 2005 against the provincial government’s decision to 
convert university grants into loans. In Mexico, students protested during the 1998-1999 
academic year against the governing board’s decision to raise tuition at the National 
Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM). And, in California students protested during 
the 1994-1995 school year against the Board of Regents’ plan to stop the University of 
California’s affirmative action programs.
These three cases were selected because they were the most reported, and therefore 
one could say the most significant, student protests to occur in their respective nations in the 
past decade. Furthermore, they were appropriate to this study because the similarities 
between these cases make them comparable while the differences between them make it 
possible to analyse the validity of the four political process variables just described. All three 
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cases were comparable in terms of the issue disputed, as student protestors in each case 
claimed that they were fighting to keep universities accessible to all sectors of society.79
Second, students in each case protested for approximately a year, and this long length of 
protest as well as statements from protest participants indicate that the movements each 
explored and exhausted all the protest tactics feasible in their respective situations.80 Third, 
the protestors had similar goals: in each case they were trying to block a specific new policy. 
Fourth, in all three cases the policy in question did not affect the entire student population 
uniformly. In California and Québec, the protested policy was aimed directly at students 
from racial and class minorities, respectively;81 in Mexico, the 65 USD proposed increase in 
undergraduate tuition82 would also affect poorer students infinitely more than students from 
higher-income families, and completely excluded graduate students. Nevertheless, a final 
79 The affirmative action debate in California was about access for racial minorities, while the debates in 
Québec and Mexico were about access for all socio-economic classes. Nevertheless, this difference should be 
mitigated by the fact that students in all three cases claimed they were fighting for the diversity of the student 
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the abolishment of affirmative action the UC introduced admissions preferences based on economic class in 
order to insure the racial diversity of the student population. It is therefore possible to surmise that if the issue 
in California has been about class preferences instead of race preferences, a similar number of students would 
have been directly affected by the contested policy, and a similar number of students would have been 
swayed by the rhetoric of the protestors.
Finally, despite the fact that the affirmative action debate had the obvious potential of placing minorities and 
white students in competition, the pro-affirmative action protests were supported by the majority of all UC 
students as well as all nine UC Student Governments. At the same time, policy-makers in Québec and Mexico 
attempted to frame the debate by appealing to the self-interests of wealthier students: they argued that cuts to 
subsidies and increased private funding of higher education were necessary in order to prevent a rapid 
decrease in the quality of education. There is therefore no reason to believe that the different outcomes of the 
three movement related to the divisive nature of the issues and their different potentials to pit students against 
each other.
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similarity between the cases was that, despite the targeted nature of the policies, student 
protestors received support from students of all races and classes. 
The major differences between the three cases that make them applicable to this study 
are their different outcomes- success in Québec and Mexico, failure in California- and the 
different institutional frameworks in which protest occurred. Furthermore, the targets of the 
protests also varied: Québec students were trying to change a budgeting decision of the 
provincial government, Mexican students were trying to reverse a tuition change passed by a 
university governing board, and Californian students were trying to convince members of the 
governing board to uphold a policy that the university had a long history of defending. If 
anything, this difference implies that student protestors in California should have had an 
easier time succeeding83 and therefore makes these three protests even more interesting as 
case studies. A more detailed description of the three cases follows.
A) QUÉBEC
The Québec student strikes began when the provincial government, headed by the 
Liberal Party of Premiere Jean Charest, modified the Grants and Loans programme for higher 
education by transforming $103 million worth of student grants into loans. The effect of this 
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Bakke vs. the Regents of the University of California legal case to publicly defend affirmative action. 
Therefore, the end of affirmative action was unexpected and counter to prevailing tendencies. 
Finally, it can also be assumed that provincial governments are less responsive than university governing 
boards, as they have more constituent groups to appease and are geographically further from the principal site 
of protest. Therefore, protestors in Québec may have been up against a larger challenge.
policy was that students supported by the grants suddenly found themselves in greater debt. 
This policy change was made despite the fact that the Liberal platform in the 2004 general 
election campaign promised to maintain the freeze on higher education tuition.
The student protests that ensued were the largest ever staged in Québec history. 
Negotiations with the government and student marches began in April 2004 and continued 
for over a year without result. Student strikes beginning on February 24, 2005 were led by 
both CÉGEP (Québec colleges) and university students; many technical colleges participated 
as well. At the peak of the protests over half of the entire student population of the province 
was on strike, with 230,000 out of 450,000 students participating.
Although the protests began as independent movements on CÉGEP campuses, as the 
protests spread to the universities three student unions began coordinating the management of 
the strikes at a province-wide level. These unions were the FEUQ and the FECQ coalition 
(Féderation Étudiante Universitaire du Québec and Fédération Étudiante Collégiale du 
Québec), which was strongly affiliated with the Parti Québecois (the PQ, the provincial 
separatist party), and the CASSÉE (Coalition de l’Association pour une Solidarité Syndicale 
Étudiante), which is loosely connected to l’Action Démocratique du Québec (the ADQ, the 
provincial left-wing party). Although these two union groups continually bickered over the 
goals of the movement, they were jointly responsible for negotiating the resolution of the 
protests with the governing Liberal Party. The FECQ and FEUQ favoured a return to grant-
based higher education funding, while CASSÉE’s goals ultimately expanded to include a 
demand for free tuition.
While the negotiations were in process, local strike committees were formed at every 
campus involved in the protests; these committees held weekly ratification assemblies for 
student participants, the results of which were communicated to the student unions.84
Congresses were also held regularly, and these were open to all citizens of the province.
The students were given moral support by the PQ and the ADQ. They were also given 
direct support by worker’s unions who helped establish picket squads, made financial 
donations to the protestors, provided free public transportation to student strikers, and 
sponsored advertisements of the students’ arguments. Teachers unions joined in with rotating 
strikes and maintenance workers at universities also proclaimed a day of strike in solidarity.  
The demonstrations called by the student unions consistently saw tens of thousands of 
supporters, including the families of students, schoolchildren, and workers. For example, a 
Montréal march held on March 18th, 2005 had 80,000 participants, while one in Québec City 
on March 24th had 10,000. On numerous occasions, such marches succeeded in blocking 
major thoroughfares; in March and April of 2005 alone the students disrupted highway 
traffic, blocked access to the port of Montréal and the Casino, and occupied the offices of 
members of the provincial legislature.
The strike ended on April 2, 2005 when the FECQ and FEUQ broke ranks with the 
CASSÉE and negotiated a deal with the government. The Liberal Party agreed to reinvest 
$482 million into student grants by the start of the 2006-07 school year.85 This amount was 
significantly more than the $103 million initially cut, yet the CASSÉE and its membership 
were disappointed that more radical concessions were not reached. Nevertheless, they too 
officially ended the strikes and students returned to class on April 11th.86
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continued to reject the agreement for the following two weeks.
B) MEXICO
The stimulus of the student protests in Mexico was a proposal by UNAM Rector 
Francisco Barnés de Castro to increase undergraduate tuition. This proposal was made in part 
because the federal government had cut the university’s budget by 30 percent and because 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) were pressuring the 
Ministry of Education to encourage private university funding. The proposal was approved 
by the university’s governing board at a meeting that occurred off-campus and that excluded 
the Student Board Representatives. 
The students were already organised into a variety of informal student organisations 
including the Unión Revolutionario Emiliano Zapata, the Frente Popular Francisco Villa, the 
Movimiento Proletario Independiente, and the Trotskyist Juventud Socialista.87 After the 
protests began, a General Strike Council (GSC) was elected, composed of representatives 
from many of these factions. Originally, the demands of the protestors were limited to the 
return to the original tuition rate and the resignation of Rector Barnés. However, the GSC 
also issued a set of four additional goals including immunity from academic and legal 
sanctions for protestors, an alteration of the university governance structure to include more 
student representation, a return of the automatic admission policy for graduates of high 
schools affiliated with the UNAM, and the removal of the time limit for graduation so that 
students could continue their studies for an indefinite number of years. These last two 
demands were aimed at the elimination of university policies that had been instituted in 1997 
against student opposition.88
The UNAM strike lasted for two semesters. A number of faculty-led groups from the 
UNAM and the PRD-led municipal government of Mexico City supported the student 
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protests. The PRD (Partido de la Revolución Democrática) refused to send police to the sites 
of protest, and the leader of the party, Cárdenas, spoke formally in favour of the students. 
Meanwhile, faculty groups participated in rallies and supported the students at formal 
negotiations. The student movement also had widespread societal support from trade unions, 
faculty and regular citizens, who participated in marches and rallies and utilised public media 
to voice their approval of the students’ position. Civilian members of the Zapatista Army of 
National Liberation joined students at demonstrations outside of UNAM’s administrative 
buildings and inspired student organisers to form a General University Consultation.89
Meanwhile, members of workers’ unions formed armed guards that patrolled the campus to 
discourage attacks on the students. 
Throughout the strike a number of marches and rallies were held, including a May 
12th rally in which 100,000 protestors participated.90 These demonstrations saw tens of 
thousands of student participants not only from the UNAM, but also from the National 
Polytechnic Institute and 30 other universities. The GSC also organised National Student 
Encounters attended by students from all over the country, and in mid-May students from 33 
universities agreed to form the National Student Coordinating Committee, a permanent 
radical student organisation designed to institutionalise national support for student protests.
On June 3, 1999, after 10 months of strikes, Rector Barnés capitulated to student 
demands by making the tuition charge voluntary.91 He also promised immunity to student 
strikers, and extended the spring semester so that students could take their examinations. 
While many students accepted these concessions, radical groups hoping to realise some of 
their secondary goals continued to protest on campus.
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In response, the university held a referendum in which all students and faculty were 
asked whether they approved of the Rector’s proposal and supported the end of the strike: 
172,000 people voted, with ninety percent in favour of returning to classes.92 However, 
radical students refused to break the strike and continued to occupy campus buildings. As a 
result 2,500 federal police officers with batons and riot shields occupied the university. 745 
student protestors were rounded up and jailed, bringing the student movement to its end.93
C) California
The student movement at the University of California broke out in an attempt to 
prevent the passing of two anti-affirmative action proposals put before the governing board. 
When Regent Ward Connerly first introduced SP-1 and SP-2, which together regulated 
admissions as well as employment and contracting by the University, the policies seemed 
doomed to failure. Affirmative action was mandated by California’s Constitution and 
Legislature and was a key component of the university’s culture, celebrated as a mark of 
institutional progress.94 Furthermore, affirmative action was publicly supported by the UC’s 
President, all nine campus Chancellors, all nine Academic Senates, all nine campus Student 
Associations, and the university’s Alumni Association.95 Nevertheless, because of political 
support from outside of the UC, these two policies provoked what has been called “one of the 
most prolonged and contentious policy disputes in higher education in the US.”96
Twelve months of organising against the policies took place before the Regents voted 
on the proposals. Students formed the radical Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action By 
Any Means Necessary (BAMN) and the Affirmative Action Coalition. They organised 
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walkouts and conferences, circulated petitions and threatened litigation.97 Other campus 
groups developed innovative protest tactics such as “Black Outs” during which protestors 
dressed in black enacted scenes of racial discrimination.98 The University of California 
Student Association (UCSA) also organised a series of marches, meetings and rallies at every 
UC campus that were attended by thousands of students.99 Interestingly, student organisers 
explicitly complained that non-student groups in favour of affirmative action were not 
willing to cooperate with the students.100
Furthermore, the student movement utilised institutional routes to fight for their 
goals. Student Regent Ed Gomes introduced a counter-proposal to the Board (which was 
voted down),101 students spoke in favour of affirmative action at Board meetings, and the 
UCSA invited Jesse Jackson to address the Board on their behalf.
Although the students saw mass participation at their events, and although affirmative 
action had widespread administrative support, the outcome of the movement was not 
successful. On July 20, 1995 the UC Board of Regents passed both proposals during a 14-
hour meeting.102 They were interrupted twice by bomb threats.103
Students continued their movement even after the Regents’ vote, working both to 
reverse the Regents’ actions and prevent state-level anti-affirmative action policies from 
being passed. Student organisations continued to hold protests and teach-ins at all nine 
campuses for the next sixteen months. In addition, a group of students from the UC Santa 
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Barbara filed a lawsuit against the Regents;104 in October, over 5,000 students rallied at the 
UC Berkeley and a campus-wide walk-out stopped many classes, while students at the UC 
Irvine held a three-week long hunger strike.105 Students also started holding protests outside 
of virtually every Board meeting, and during the December meeting, fifty-nine students were 
arrested for blockading a Berkeley administrative building.106
Nevertheless, on November 5, 1996 California voters passed Proposition 209, the 
California Civil Rights Initiative (CCRI),107 and the Board of Regents refused to re-vote on 
SP-1 or SP-2. The student movement, as well as other social movements in support of 
affirmative action, had failed.108
SUMMARY
This study hypothesises that four context variables influenced the outcomes of these 
student protests: the status of students, their history of protest and political participation, 
educational governance structures and the availability of political allies. The validity of 
these institutional frameworks will be tested in the next chapter by analysing their 
presence and role in two successful cases of student protest in Québec and Mexico and 
the one unsuccessful example in California.
While these six variables are likely strong determinants of student protest 
outcomes, it should be noted that other factors influence movement success as well. First, 
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successful protest can depend as much on internal movement variables as on the context 
in which protest occurs. So, for example, it is impossible to conclude that the student 
protests in Québec were successful because of the context in which they occurred and not 
also because protestors utilised strong tactics to mobilise and sustain their movement. 
Nevertheless, the findings of this paper are limited: the assertion is not that context 
determines the outcomes of protests in all cases, merely that the institutional variables 
identified in this chapter facilitate student protests and therefore their presence or non-
presence in the three different environments contributed to the outcomes of these 
movements.
Second, although this project isolates the external determinants of student protest 
outcomes, it should be noted that the internal and context variables of student movements 
are in reality greatly intertwined. For example, the tactics utilised by protestors are 
influenced by the history of student activism at a university as well as the alliances that 
they are capable of forming and the political cultures in which they are located. Similarly, 
the number of students who participate in protests depends on the size of the university 
and the unity and characteristics of the national student identity, and even the initial 
grievance and goal of the movement are influenced by context.109 As this study examines 
the influence of environment on protest outcomes, it was necessary to separate these two 
sets of variables for analytical purposes. 
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However, because internal and external movement variables are interdependent, 
internal movement variables are at least partially controlled for in this comparative case 
study. Assuming that protestors in each case exhausted all the tactics and resources they had 
available, the major differences in movement tactics between the cases must therefore have 
been a product of the institutional frameworks the protests engaged. For example, the reason 
that massive strikes were not employed in California was likely because there was no state-
wide student union to coordinate one and no alliance to make a strike an effective tactic;110
the reason that there was no student union was because the education system is decentralised 
and student status fractured.111 Therefore, it is unlikely that internal movement variables such 
as protest tactics were the root cause of the different outcomes of the three cases.
Finally, some context variables have been excluded from this study because of the 
impossibility of testing them in the three cases examined. While the commonalities 
between the three cases made the contexts in which the protests occurred more 
significant, they also limited the types of variables that could be examined. For example, 
although student protest literature indicates that the geographic location of protests 
influences protest outcomes, this cannot be substantiated by this study because the 
protests in Canada, the United States and Mexico all took place in large, urban areas. 
Similarly, while scholars of student protest have indicated that the types of goals selected 
by student protestors, particularly whether they are campus or society-oriented goals, 
influence chances of success, protestors in the three cases in question all had similar 
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demands, namely the reversal of a specific policy. Therefore, this study is by no means 
exhaustive, and it is sincerely hoped that future research will address some of these 
issues.
The following chapter will evaluate the importance of the four external variables of 
student protest outcomes described here. In particular, Chapter 4 will analyse the institutional 
frameworks of the socio-political and education environment in Québec, Mexico, and 
California to see whether characteristics of these different contexts aided in the development 
of cognitive liberation and the creation of political opportunity structures for student 
protestors.
CHAPTER 4: POLITICAL PROCESS VARIABLES
INTRODUCTION
This study had thus far taken a theoretical bent, analysing social movement theories 
in order to better understand the external determinants of student protest outcomes. 
Political process theory suggests that student protestors can build stronger, more 
successful movements if student status in society is well defined and if students see 
themselves as a competent and historically influential political group. Theory also 
predicts that educational environments characterised by a centralised, public authority 
that provides institutionalised avenues of student participation in university governance 
favour the development and successful resolution of student movements. Finally, the 
political process model implies that the formation of student-nonstudent alliances is also 
critical for successful student protests.
This chapter will analyse the student protests in Québec, California and Mexico in 
order to see whether these political process variables are supported by empirical evidence. If 
these variables are significant, then the education environment at the University of California 
should be characterised by fewer of these institutional frameworks than the environments 
students confronted in Québec and Mexico.
Based on the three cases examined, it appears that political process hypotheses of 
student protest outcomes are quite accurate. A developed, elite and politically-e fficacious 
student identity and a history of successful student protests do aid student activists in 
mobilising and sustaining movements. Furthermore, centralised, publicly-funded universities 
with a high degree of co-governance also aid activists, as do the creation of outside alliances.
1. STUDENT STATUS AND IDENTITY
Political process theory implies that the formation of a cohesive student identity 
combined with a sense of political efficacy increases the possibilities that students can form 
successful challenging groups. This hypothesis is supported by evidence from the cases of 
student protest in Québec, Mexico and the United States.
In Mexico, it is clear that students form a clearly defined social group. This identity 
stems in part from common experience: Meyers and Rubinson describe how student status is 
developed at the national level through national entrance examinations and a historically 
strong ministry of education that homogenises the university experience across the country.112
Federal education policy since 1989, focussed on quality control and incentive funding at the 
bequest of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, has produced an even 
112 Meyer and Rubinson, “Structural Determinants of Student Political Activity”, 32.
stronger evaluation system of undergraduate and graduate programs.113 The effect of these 
policies was to unify the student experience even further. 114
Student identity in Mexico also stems from a mythology of the role of students in 
society that has survived since the Mexican Revolution of 1910. At the first National Student 
Congress in Mexico, held at the UNAM two months before the outbreak of the Revolution, 
many of the objectives of the Revolution were debated and articulated by the students.115 The 
students therefore became an important representative group of the Revolution: in fact, in the 
early years of the new republic, between 1916 and 1920, the Mexican government even 
appointed student attachés to all of its embassies and international delegations.116 Since the 
Revolution, the UNAM has been seen as a place where questions of national concern should 
be raised and discussed.
It is clear then that students in Mexico not only have a defined identity, they have an 
elite status and political role. Such a role is common in many developing countries where 
illiteracy is common and where students have access to more knowledge than the average 
citizen; Kevin Lyonette notes that in such situations students are viewed with great respect 
because it is assumed that they are not only informed, but also idealistic, untainted, and more 
likely to feel obliged to improve their countries than other elites.117 Although contemporary 
Mexico now has high literacy rates,118 public officials as well as the population in general still 
hold intellectuals in high regard.119 This is exemplified by the fact that many public figures 
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take pride in being considered well-read or literary, perhaps a tradition stemming from the 
1920s when every revolutionist took care to appoint intellectuals to their staffs.120
Furthermore, in a survey of students in four different countries, Bakke and Bakke found that 
students in Mexico, more than in any other country, “generally considered themselves the 
avant-garde of the defenders of those objectives of continuing revolution, emphasizing 
concerns for the welfare of all Mexicans and their fuller enjoyment of the economic and 
social benefits made possible by a modernised and politically stable Mexico”121 and that 
“subjectively they considered themselves already to be mature persons as capable as their 
elders of functioning in the current adult world.”122
Educational policy has reinforced the image of the University as a defender of 
Mexican welfare, the underprivileged and the powerless. A declaration of civic engagement 
is apparent in the UNAM’s and other public universities’ organisational charters,123 and it is 
common for UNAM medical students, architects, and engineers to spend most of their final 
year of studies working at internships in rural villages.124
Although this revolutionary image of the student may be in part myth, it is a self-
perpetuating myth. As Bakke and Bakke found in their surveying of the Mexican 
population, 
“Of all citizen groups, aside from the inner governing circle and the army, the 
students are most aware of the strength of their collective voice in affecting 
the affairs of society generally, even to having a significant part in the 
overthrow of governments.”125
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This sense of political efficacy, combined with an elite status and a desire for social 
change, makes Mexican students a prime group for social activism. Furthermore, as will 
be shown in the next section, the students’ sense of political efficacy is not only a dream: 
it is greatly reinforced by their successful history of political participation and struggle.
In stark contrast to the Mexican education system, the American system produces 
little sense of community among students from different colleges. Nor does it view 
students as social or political elites; in fact, for the most part the American education 
system functions with an understanding of the student as a private individual still coming 
of age. 
Two of the main systemic differences that explain the absence of an American 
student identity are the lack of a central education ministry126 and the existence of a large 
private sector.127 None has ever existed in the United States; instead, the amount of 
governance by religious and other private organisations is extensive.128 This has produced 
a hierarchical education system in which universities vary widely in ideology, academic 
rigor and student population; there are no common entrance requirements, class content 
regulations, or graduation requirements in the American system. As Philip Altbach has 
noted, “students at Harvard…have little in common with their compeers at a community 
college in Oklahoma.”129 Therefore, there is little sense of community or common identity 
among students. 
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In fact, it often seems as though American universities are in direct competition with 
one another. American universities, almost 3/4 of which are private, rely heavily on non-
government funding and therefore compete with each other in terms of college rankings, 
sports, students, and high-profile professors. Indeed, most American universities have 
public relations departments and marketing professionals charged with differentiating 
them from the competition, with the result that American students identify strongly with 
their own campus, but have very little sense of a state- or nation-wide student 
community.130
Furthermore, as Meyer and Rubinson note, the American student is “seen as a private 
person, not an element in public life,” who is still going through a difficult process of coming 
of age.131 For this reason, even after the official elimination of the practice, the tradition of ‘in 
loco parentis’ is still apparent on most American campuses; residential colleges often provide 
counselling and mentoring services for students and strictly regulate social practices such as 
parties, drinking, and sexual encounters. Student status is seen as a time when young people 
can experiment, make mistakes, and begin to prepare themselves for the adult world and the 
responsibilities they will possess upon graduation. For this reason, “In American society… it 
still is common to point out that politically active students are but naïve and inexperienced 
‘children’,”132 whereas in Mexico students are seen as members of the political elite.
Finally, not only are American students encouraged to think of themselves as youths 
as opposed to fully developed political actors, and as members of a unique campus as 
opposed to members of a nationwide social group, they are also encouraged to see 
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themselves as belonging to a private community isolated from national politics. This is done 
by creating a residential “campus bubble”, a self-sufficient area complete with its own 
administration, health services, post office, entertainment and physical facilities. While most 
American universities provide campus housing for undergraduates, only a small fraction of 
Quebec and Mexican students live in residence and students therefore have far more daily 
interaction with the outside community.
Although students in Québec are not granted the same status of defenders of social 
justice as their Mexican counterparts, it is clear that a province-wide student identity is more 
established than in the American system. As in Mexico, the Québec education environment is 
characterised by an all-powerful ministry of education. In fact, the Québec ministry of 
education is perhaps more bureaucratised and controlling than that of Mexico due to the 
province’s struggles to remain independent of federal rule.133 The highly bureaucratised 
ministry has produced a system of universities that are not hierarchically differentiated from 
one another,134 in which professors have little control over their courses and in which 
universities are governed by rigid rules.135 As there are no private universities in Québec, all 
students are treated to virtually identical experiences. This creation of a universal student 
experience produces a corresponding universal student identity. Therefore, Québec students 
see themselves as a united social group rather than as a member of any particular college 
campus. And although Québec students are not endowed with a history of revolutionary 
struggle as in Mexico,136 their identity as viable political actors is apparent in the 
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institutionalised presence of student political organisations and the many examples of 
effective student activism in the province.
Finally, it is worth noting that the character of student status partially reflects national 
political cultures. Therefore, it is not surprising that the Mexican political culture, which 
generally holds intellectuals in high regard and often seeks out their ‘expert opinion’ on 
political issues, accords the same political voice to students. The American political culture,
on the other hand, is more likely to seek out the opinion of business elites as non-government 
experts and, according to Altbach, has a tradition of distrust of the involvement of 
intellectuals in political life, 137 and of political figures in general.138 Similarly, while many 
union activists and student activists in Mexico and Québec become politicians, activism in 
the United States seldom leads to a political career.139
2. PROTEST HISTORY
Cognitive liberation and a sense of political efficacy derive in large part from a 
successful history of activism, and the presence of such a history also implies that modern 
social movements have political opportunity structures they can continue to exploit. Québec 
and Mexican students both have a lively history of student activism and political 
participation, much of it successful.
Over the last fifty years, Québec students have declared official province-wide strikes 
eight times: in 1968, 1974, 1978, 1982, 1988, 1996, and most recently 2005. As a result of 
this activism, students successfully pressured the provincial government to institute a freeze 
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on tuition rates in 1996 and have since blocked all attempts to remove it. They have also 
established and defended increases in student representation.
Mexican students similarly have a history of mobilising effectively to influence 
government policy. In 1929 university students in Mexico City protested the frequency of 
examinations and other evaluation measures, and as a result the Ministry of Education 
granted the National University autonomy from government intervention.140 In 1948 and 
1966, student movements reversed education policies instituted by the Board and forced the 
resignation of two Rectors.141 In 1987 students at the UNAM prevented the administration 
from implementing more rigorous entrance exams,142 and in both 1986 and 1992 they 
successfully opposed the administration’s attempts to raise tuition.143
Of course, not all student protests were successful: in 1968 students successfully shut 
down UNAM for over two months in protest against government authoritarianism, however 
this attempt ended in the infamous Tlatelolco massacre of protestors and innocent civilians. 
Nevertheless, students in both Québec and Mexico have played a significant historical role in 
creating the contemporary education environment, for example by successfully fighting for 
increased student participation in governance and lower tuition. 
This history of activism is particularly important to this analysis because it helped to 
lend greater importance to contemporary student protests; when students in Québec protest 
cuts in higher education spending, they are defending a right- equal access-  initially won 
through student protest. This fact helped protestors frame the issue: students not only had a 
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precedent of success to follow and learn from, they had a hard-earned right to defend. 
Similarly, the protests in Mexico may have appeared to be over a small, virtually 
insignificant increase in tuition, but there as well the issue of accessibility has a history as a
right won and defended by students. Protest organisers in both places were able to inspire 
greater participation by trading on this history.
In contrast to virtually all other countries, American universities have had such a 
curious absence of significant student protest that scholars of student activism are apt to 
crack jokes: George Bereday for example quipped, “Until the riots for or against civil rights 
were ushered in a decade ago, the history of American universities registered hardly more 
than a sequence of panty raids.”144 Shortly after the more turbulent years of student unrest 
over civil rights and the war in Vietnam, Philip Altbach observed that, 
“American students have not had a strong tradition of political activism. Nor 
have students ever been effective in producing major political change in the 
United States. This lack of an accepted tradition of activism has made it 
difficult for activists to effectively organise on campus.”145
In fact, the only nation-wide student strike ever to occur on American soil, in 
response to the Kent State shootings, was short lived and produced no effect on 
America’s involvement in Cambodia or Vietnam, or on preventing the implementation of 
the draft, the exoneration of the Guardsmen who had shot the students, or the indictment 
of students involved in the protest.
Nevertheless, the UC’s Berkeley campus has had one of the most significant histories 
of student protest of any university system in the nation. Berkeley jumpstarted the 1960’s 
student protests with its Free Speech Movement, during which it was also the site of the first 
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American instance of a student occupation of a campus building.146 Since that time, Berkeley 
students have also famously protested course content, ROTC recruitment, and the American 
intervention in Cambodia.147 However, while Berkeley may be a ‘hotbed’ of student activism, 
these movements have had very little success at changing social policy. In his history of 
protest and reform at Berkeley, Neil Smelser notes that few of these university crises 
produced successful change; in fact, the only issues that students have ever successfully 
protested have been campus issues such as the creation of new courses, the alteration of 
course requirements and the modification of the grading system.148 According to Smelser, 
students have unfortunately been unsuccessful thus far at changing wider social policy and at 
having an impact outside of the university.149
Political process theory implies that this history of failure at producing social change 
would dampen contemporary protests. Students might have trouble mobilising their 
compeers and forming alliances, and would face additional obstacles because of the absence 
of strong political representation. Furthermore, Smelser also observes that this history of 
failed protest has, “produced direct countermeasures, such as more careful surveillance of 
student and nonstudent behaviour by the campus administration, an increase in the number of 
disciplinary actions, and more police on campus more often.”150
3. EDUCATIONAL GOVERNANCE
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Political process theory suggests that the institutional decision-making structure 
greatly affects protestors’ ability to effect systemic change. In particular, two hypotheses 
were put forward: first, that centralised education systems are more conducive to successful 
student activism, and second, that education systems that allow for student participation in 
university governance also facilitate student power. These hypotheses are supported by 
evidence from the outcomes of the three student protest case studies.
The Mexican education system is centralised under the control of the SEP (The 
National Ministry of Education). Traditionally, the SEP has been the main funding source 
and regulator of the education system. 151 Until the 1980s more than 90% of the student body 
was enrolled in public institutions,152 and federal grants still constitute over 90% of public 
universities’ budgets. 153 However, since the 1929 Organic Law was passed as a result of 
student protests, most universities have been granted complete institutional autonomy. 
Faculties and schools within the UNAM system also have autonomous administrations.
This centralised governance system combined with institutional autonomy has created 
many openings for student-led reform. The Organic Law established a system in which 
faculty and students would be equally represented on the University Council. This system 
provided a significant role for students as co-governors of the university, as the University 
Council elected the Rector, deans and directors through direct vote and their positions could 
be revoked at any time.154 This governance structure was modified in 1944, but for over a 
decade students held institutionalised power equal to that of faculty and staff and even today 
students continue to have equal representation on the governing board of the university and 
of each faculty.
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Because the UNAM is splintered into autonomous faculties and schools, the ability of 
the central administration and the federal government to control and discipline protests is 
very reduced. Since the granting of autonomy, the federal government has been legally 
prohibited from interfering in protests unless officially summoned by the UNAM governing 
board. However, government influence has been highly frowned upon since the student 
protests of 1968 when government troops massacred students and civilians; any decision by 
the governing board to violate university autonomy again in this way would lead to massive 
public turmoil and the forced resignation of board members and possibly the collapse of the 
government itself. Furthermore, the central administration at the UNAM is also quite 
powerless: student demonstrations can move from one autonomous faculty to another, and 
therefore never face a central authority.155 Meanwhile, the teaching staff and administrators at 
most faculties are for the most part not trained or hired to address student unrest. The UNAM 
governance system is therefore characterised by its inability to discipline student protests.156
The centralised education system also provides further opportunity structures for 
student influence because it provides a direct avenue between students and the national 
government, which until 2000 was monopolised by the PRI party (Partido Revolucionario 
Institutional) party. One of the PRI’s governing policies that allowed it to maintain 
authoritarian control for over seventy years was its policy of co-opting dissident groups, 
including students. Thus, in the 1970s the government of Luis Echeverría deliberately 
attempted to maintain the loyalty of the students by granting their demands.157 The PRI has 
also made mass mobilisation into a tool of the regime because of its popular roots as the 
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people’s revolutionary party.158 As McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly note, a high degree of social 
contention was permitted by PRI elites, who preferred to grant reforms to protestors rather 
than let them form a strong political opposition.159
Even in Mexico’s contemporary open political environment, personal favours are still 
customary and so student political leaders, who have a high tendency of launching into 
political careers after graduation, are sometimes granted favours in the hopes that they will 
be repaid in the future.160 Furthermore, the federal ministry must be lenient with student 
dissidents because of the large nature of this voting constituency: not only is the student 
population large in its own right, it has a long history of swaying public opinion because of 
the influential status of students in Mexican society.
The Mexican education system is also characterised by a high degree of student 
participation in governance that aids student protestors. Student societies or councils exist in 
each faculty. These student organisations are completely autonomous from the university 
administration; they work as pressure groups to represent student interests.161
Furthermore, a distinctively Latin American system of co-governance exists at the 
UNAM that provides for the inclusion of two student representatives on the governing board 
of the university and on each of the governing councils of the faculties.162 These student 
representatives are elected by the student body and have direct access to the centres of 
decision-making at the UNAM.
The American education system has virtually none of the qualities of the Mexican 
system that increase student power. First, over one-third of college and university students 
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are enrolled at private institutions that are not subject to any government authority.163 Second, 
even public universities are not regulated by a central authority in any meaningful sense. The 
American Constitution makes no mention of education, and federal policy under both 
Democratic and Republican rule for the past forty years has emphasised consumer 
determination as opposed to government intervention.164 State departments of education have 
jurisdiction over chartering universities and regulating standards and quality, but according to 
the Department of Education this role has traditionally been limited to financial assistance 
policy.165 Therefore, even public universities such as the UC are largely free to govern 
themselves.
Instead of centralising policy, it has been proposed that the American education 
system was developed in order to “localise bureaucracy.”166 Private institutions have been 
completely free from state officials since the nineteenth century, while most public 
universities have their own autonomous governing boards. However, while the granting of 
autonomy to public institutions in Mexico has led to a vacuum of control over students, the 
American educational bureaucracy has produced the opposite effect: university 
administrations, trustees, schools and departments each possess decision-making powers and 
the ability to control student activism.167
At the UC, many analysts have noted the firm concentration of power in the hands of 
the Board of Regents.168 In fact, most respondents in a survey of the UC community identified 
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the members of the Governing board as “the most powerful and relevant individuals in 
University life.”169 Regent Tom Sayles himself is quoted as saying, “being a Regent as the 
closest thing to knighthood in America.”170 The UC board is for the most part autonomous 
from government interference, although members of the board are appointed directly by the 
governor of California and for the most part are composed of political supporters of the party 
in power.171 A historian of the UC system, Martin Trow, has noted that autonomy from 
outside interference has led to a “distaste for political activity inside the University as 
well.”172 While the UC is supposed to have a tradition of shared governance between faculty 
and administration, final-say on policy is the reserved right of the Board of Regents.173
Moreover, even the pretence of “shared governance” between the faculty and the 
administration excludes the idea of “co-governance” with students that is at the heart of the 
Mexican education system. Trow also notes that the democratic nature of the faculty’s 
representative forum, the Academic Senate, is compromised through appointive procedures 
and through consensual decision-making instead of voting; therefore, at the UC even faculty 
do not bargain collectively to assure their working rights and pay conditions.174 Regent Ward 
Connerly summarised the position of the Board nicely in his memoirs by calling it the 
broader and include the right to appoint the entire administrative staff. (see Clark, The Higher Education 
System, 129).
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“center of power.”175 In the UC education system, student and even faculty are excluded from 
the institutional decision-making process.
Student organising and political participation at the UC is also limited. Although the 
university’s student government, the Associated Students of the University of California 
(ASUC), was politicised during the Free Speech Movement of the 1960s, many participants 
in the student radical movement are averse to working through the organisation because of 
the considerable control that the university administration has over ASUC affairs.176
Furthermore, students only have one out of 26 votes on the Board of Regents, and the 
Student Regent must be accepted by the Regents and selected by the ASUC instead of by a 
direct campus-wide student vote.
The effects of this education system are clear. UC student protestors have to deal with 
a number of decision-makers including the Academic Senate, the Offices of the President, 
the administrations of each campus, and the Board of Regents. Moreover, many protestors 
mistrust the official student government because of its ties to the administration, and students 
are in no meaningful way incorporated into the legitimate institutional decision-making 
structure. 
Because every university in the state has its own governing board that sets 
institutional policy and because American student identity is campus-based, there is little 
chance of receiving support from students of neighbouring universities: As former Harvard 
University president Derek Bok noted, “the advantages of a competitive, decentralised 
system are never so evident as in periods when large social changes sweep over 
universities”177 because movements rarely can sweep over multiple universities.
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The Canadian education system, like the Mexican model, exhibits a large degree of 
centralisation and of student organisation and participation. Provincial governments have had 
complete jurisdiction over education since 1966 and are the primary source of funding for 
post secondary institutions.178 In Québec, the Ministère de l’Éducation, du Loisir et du Sport 
regulates education policy for the nine universities located in Québec, including the 
Université du Québec system that consists of ten branches. These universities are, however, 
legal entities that have a significant amount of autonomy.179 This leads to the creation of an 
institutional framework similar to that of Mexico, where no governing body is willing to take 
full responsibility for student protestors. Furthermore, the Ministry of Education and the head 
offices of the Université du Québec are located in Québec City, over three hours drive from 
the usual centre of protest in Montréal. 
Membership in a university students’ union is mandatory across Canada, and union 
fees of $50 to $300 are included automatically in tuition. These student unions are well 
known for their political lobbying and negotiating, and most student governments are also 
responsible for representing their student bodies at the municipal, provincial and federal 
government levels as well as at the university itself. Most student unions in Canada are also 
members of one of two rival national lobby organisations based in Ottawa, the Canadian 
Federation of Students and the Canadian Alliance of Student Associations, that are 
responsible for monitoring and negotiating federal funding policies. Jill Conway identifies 
the “liveliness” of the tradition of student unions in Canada as one of the main differences 
between university life in Canada and the U.S. She explains this difference by noting that the 
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Canadian system, like the Mexican as well as the British system on which it was modelled, 
sees high school graduates as mature citizens. Furthermore, student government in Canada is 
seen as an important preparation for a future career in politics, and student political leaders 
are treated in Canada with much of the same respect they are given in Mexico.180
Student political participation is perhaps even more institutionalised and mobilised in 
Québec than in other provinces. French-speaking students have politically been associated 
with provincial syndicalism, and some student unions openly state their aim of transforming 
capitalist society. Currently, the student movement in Québec is divided into two permanent 
union groups, the centre-left FEUQ and FECQ and the left-wing CASSÉE. The FECQ and 
FEUQ are highly integrated in the provincial political scene and have been described as 
“essentially function[ing] as a training group for future Parti Québecois (PQ) bureaucrats,”181
while the CASSÉE is strongly affiliated with provincial trade unions and worker’s unions, as 
well as the province’s most left-wing political party, the ADQ. In 2005, the CASSÉE, the 
FEUQ, and the FECQ joined forces to coordinate the student movement.
4. SYSTEMS OF ALLIANCES
According to political process theory, the ability of protestors to build alliances with 
social elites and institutionalised political groups is essential for the successful outcome 
of any social movement. The three case studies examined here support the hypothesis that 
non-institutional movements, such as student protests, need institutional support.
Mexican student protestors at the UNAM were able to build coalitions with important 
political allies in the Mexican political arena. Student leaders made use of nonstudent groups 
within the UNAM system such as the “eight emeriti”, a group of eight well-respected faculty 
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members who sponsored pro-student university resolutions and issued sympathetic public 
memorandums.182 The student movement was also supported by one of the national chief 
opposition parties, the PRD, and were given moral and participatory support from the 
Zapatistas.183 Cárdenas personally spoke out in support of the student strikers, and the PRD 
municipal government in Mexico City184 refused to send security forces to intervene at the 
university.185 Finally, trade unions including the electrical worker’s union also joined forces 
with the students, turning out en masse to support their public protests.
Similarly, both provincial opposition parties, the PQ and the ADQ, supported Québec 
students.186 In addition, before the students even officially called the strike, a Montreal-based 
organisation called the Reseau des Travailleurs et Travailleuses Solidaires (Workers’ 
Solidarity Network) demonstrated support for the student movement by organising picket 
squads.187 Major trade unions including the construction workers union and the transit 
worker’s union also aided the students: transit workers covered public transportation 
advertisements with strike posters and provided free transportation for student strikers, while 
the construction workers union paid for television ads that publicised the students’ position. 
During the later months of the protest, the teachers’ federation voted to join in with rotating 
strikes and maintenance workers at Québec schools also declared a one-day solidarity 
strike.188 In past student protests in both Mexico and Québec, successful alliances were also 
built between student and nonstudent groups. For example, in Mexico Communist and 
Catholic groups have historically sought to join forces with and influence student protestors 
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while student protests in Québec have historically been supported by whatever political party 
happened to be in the opposition seat.189
In the case of student protests at the UC, although there were many supporters of 
affirmative action policies,190 these potential allies declined to join ranks with the students 
and instead voiced their opinion directly to the Board of Regents. As a result of their inability 
to forge alliances with actors within either the UC system or the greater Californian political 
arena, student protest leaders felt they had no choice but to recruit an outside intellectual elite 
to support their cause. Therefore, Student Regent Ed Gomez and the ACSA officially invited 
Reverend Jesse Jackson to address the Board of Regents.191 This one alliance did significantly 
improve the mobilisation efforts of student protest leaders: according to Brian Pusser, 
“Jackson’s entrance further galvanised student interest and student support for affirmative 
action at the UC, as it increased student organisation, resistance, and protest.”192 Furthermore, 
this alliance with a social elite finally allowed the student movement to be seen as a social 
issue as opposed to merely a case of deviant students protesting university policy:193
“The invitation [of Reverend Jackson] further shifted media and public 
perceptions of the contest from an institutional policy debate to a deeper 
conflict, one that encompassed American’s long and continuing struggle over 
race and equality. The invitation turned attention to the role of education in a 
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national effort to redress racial inequality and to the ongoing linkages between 
education and income inequality.”194
More political opportunity structures were available to student protestors in the 
Québec and Mexican political environments because political elites, trade unions and other 
institutionalised political actors viewed the students as legitimate political actors and saw an 
opportunity to join in a common social cause. In part, this is because the elite student status 
in these two nations implies that students themselves can serve as useful allies in a political 
conflict. For example, in Mexico, university administrators have used students as allies when 
faced with conflicts among the faculty or deans, while faculty members have incited students 
to protest in support of their own educational objectives.195 Trade unions and opposition 
political parties similarly find it useful to make alliances with students when protests are 
aimed at challenging social policy and when these parties can find common cause with the 
students; this is why Québec student unions take part in election campaigns by aligning with 
political parties and lending their support. This rationale for alliance building is only 
available in an educational environment where students are seen as a politically-efficacious 
social group, a criteria which is not consistent with the American institutional framework. In 
the United States there is an utter lack of integration between the world of student politicians 
and national, state or municipal government:196 Weinberg and Walker claim that this causes 
student activists to tend to be conflict oriented and alienated as opposed to attempting to form 
alliances.197
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This chapter examined the extent to which variables generated from political process 
literature facilitate student protest success in the context of Québec, California and 
Mexico. Its findings are that the status of students in society plays a significant role in 
determining protest success. Societies that have a distinct and unified student identity that 
is associated with an elite status and with political competence see greater incidences of 
successful student protest. Elite and politically-efficacious student status is derived in part 
from a historical precedent of successful student protests. Therefore, a history of 
successful student protest is also a variable likely to improve prospects for student 
activists; and, besides reinforcing student status, a successful history of protest creates 
repertoires of tactics and systems of alliances that students can renew to support future 
movements.
 Additionally, institutional frameworks that centralise education policy while at the 
same time devolving power to campus authorities create an opening for student protests 
because no authority is readily available to quell protests. A centralised education system 
also helps students mobilise, as it provides an easy and logical target for students 
attempting widespread social change and helps create a united student identity. Student 
protests in centralised systems can therefore mobilise multiple university campuses and 
address general social issues as opposed to merely campus policy.
Finally, political opportunity structures that allow for the formation of alliances 
between student and non-student groups are also helpful for student protestors. As such 
opportunities are more likely in systems where student status is well developed and 
imbued with a political flavour, it is clear that all four political process variables are 
significant and interrelated. A summary of the influence of these variables in the three 
empirical case studies of protest is represented in Figure 4.
Unfortunately, the interdependence of the four variables implies that they are likely to 
be either all present or all absent in any given political context. Ian Weinberg and Kenneth 
Walker describe the process that leads to this utter lack of political opportunities and student 
consciousness in the United States. They note,
“In a decentralised political system such as the United States, which is federal, 
highly democratic, and in which the division of powers involves the 
constitutional development of a strong executive, the system linkages involve 
a decentralised funding of higher education, political interference with 
university autonomy, and no expectation that a career in student politics leads 
to a career within the political system itself. Consequently, national student 
unions are nonexistent or weak, as are student branches of the national 
political parties. The former are weak because there is no centralised authority 
entrusted with national control of higher education with which to bargain. The 
latter are weak because recruitment to political careers is not tied to high 
visibility of performance in student branches of national political parties. The 
most important types of student political organisations, therefore, are 
university student governments, which negotiate with administrations over 
basic student facilities and are generally nonpolitical.”198
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Figure 4: A summary of the cases
A
lli
a
n
ce
s
Po
lit
ic
al
 
o
pp
os
iti
o
n
 
pa
rt
ie
s,
 
tr
ad
e 
u
n
io
n
s,
 
u
n
ifi
ed
 
st
u
de
n
t u
n
io
n
s
O
pp
os
iti
o
n
 
pa
rt
ie
s,
 
tr
ad
e 
u
n
io
n
s,
 
fa
cu
lty
 
gr
o
u
p,
 fa
m
ili
es
,
 
an
d 
stu
de
n
t 
gr
o
u
ps
La
ck
 o
f 
al
lia
n
ce
-
bu
ild
in
g 
w
ith
 
po
te
n
tia
l 
pa
rt
n
er
s.
Ed
u
ca
tio
n
 
Sy
st
em
Ce
n
tr
al
ise
d 
u
n
de
r 
th
e 
M
in
ist
èr
e 
de
 
l’É
du
ca
tio
n
, 
du
 
Lo
isi
r 
et
 
du
 
Sp
or
t
Ce
n
tr
al
ise
d 
u
n
de
r 
th
e 
Se
cr
et
ar
ía
 
de
 
Ed
uc
at
ió
n 
Pú
bl
ic
a 
(S
EP
)
D
ec
en
tr
al
ise
d:
 
la
ck
 o
f s
ta
te
 
po
lic
y,
 st
ro
n
g 
bo
ar
ds
 
an
d 
u
n
iv
er
sit
y 
ad
m
in
ist
ra
tio
n
s
H
ist
o
ry
 
o
f 
Su
cc
es
s
M
an
y 
in
st
an
ce
s 
o
f s
tu
de
n
t 
ac
tiv
ism
,
 
m
o
st
 
o
f t
he
m
 
su
cc
es
sf
u
l
M
an
y 
in
st
an
ce
s 
o
f s
tu
de
n
t 
ac
tiv
ism
,
 
m
o
st
 
o
f t
he
m
 
su
cc
es
sf
u
l
M
an
y 
in
st
an
ce
s 
o
f s
tu
de
n
t 
ac
tiv
ism
,
 
fe
w
 
su
cc
es
sf
u
l a
t 
pr
o
du
ci
n
g 
so
ci
al
 
ch
an
ge
St
u
de
n
t S
ta
tu
s
U
n
ite
d 
ac
ro
ss
 
th
e 
pr
o
v
in
ce
U
n
ite
d 
ac
ro
ss
 
th
e 
co
u
n
tr
y
D
ist
in
ct
 
fo
r 
ev
er
y 
in
di
v
id
ua
l 
co
lle
ge
Is
su
e
In
cr
ea
se
 
ac
ce
ss
: 
R
ev
er
se
 
th
e 
de
ci
sio
n
 to
 
co
n
v
er
t g
ra
n
ts
 
to
 lo
an
s
In
cr
ea
se
 
ac
ce
ss
:
R
ev
er
se
 
th
e 
de
ci
sio
n
 to
 
in
cr
ea
se
 
tu
iti
o
n
Pr
es
er
v
e 
ac
ce
ss
:
Pr
ev
en
t t
he
 
el
im
in
at
io
n
 o
f 
af
fir
m
at
iv
e 
ac
tio
n
 p
ol
ic
ie
s
Ta
rg
et
Pr
o
v
in
ci
al
 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t
U
n
iv
er
sit
y 
go
ve
rn
in
g 
bo
ar
d
U
n
iv
er
sit
y 
go
ve
rn
in
g 
bo
ar
d
C
a
se
s
Qu
éb
ec
M
ex
ic
o
Ca
lif
o
rn
ia
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION
The goal of this study was to examine the role of institutional frameworks on the 
ability of student protestors to successfully bring about political change. In particular, this 
study examined the socio-political and educational frameworks of Québec, California and 
Mexico in order to isolate the differences in these environments that influenced protest 
outcomes in three cases of student activism.
In order to approach this analysis, student protest was examined as a form of 
collective political activism, making it possible to utilise social movement theory to frame 
the discussion. Political process theory, the subset of social movement literature that most 
directly addresses the influence of external factors of movement outcomes, generated a set of 
four hypotheses about the relationship of institutional frameworks and protest outcomes. 
Specifically, it was hypothesised that student protests were more likely to succeed in 
environments where student status is strong on a society-wide scale; where past student 
protests have successfully influenced politics and where students have a history of fruitful 
political participation; where educational structures are decentralised and provide 
institutionalised avenues for student participation; and where student groups have access to a 
variety of political allies.
 These four variables all help explain the different outcomes of the protests in 
Québec, California and Mexico. Mexican and Québec protestors had access to student 
support from many universities because their decentralised education systems homogenised 
student interests, while students at the UC did not see the formation of a statewide student 
movement because student identity in California and the United States in general is defined 
at the campus level. Mexican and Québec protestors also formed direct alliances with 
professors, trade unions, political parties and other community organisations because student 
political participation is more institutionalised in their environments and because students 
have a history of influencing politics and hence a recognised political status. These 
differences helped students in Québec and Mexico form a stronger movement and therefore 
improved their chances of successfully changing policy. Although the presence of any one of 
the four institutional variables identified would have theoretically helped strengthen their 
movement, all four of the variables are interrelated a hence likely to manifest themselves 
simultaneously in any political context, or not at all.
Because the state of California is not characterised by any of these four institutional 
features, nor is it exceptional in this respect compared to other American states, the 
immediate implication of these findings is that the United States, comparatively speaking, 
discourages student activism. This finding helps explain observations made by historians of 
student protest such as Bereday, Altbach and Lipset, all of who noted the relative lack of 
effect of American student activism. However, it challenges conventional views that describe 
the American policy as open to social movements.199 A more positive possible implication is 
that the obstacles to activism in the American system have encouraged activists to explore 
non-conventional, individualised means of protest in order to influence policy: for example, 
lawsuits, municipal legislation, and internet-based petitioning.
Although this study limited itself to examining three cases of student protests, its 
findings should be quite generalisable to similar cases of protest elsewhere in the world. The 
four institutional frameworks examined here should encourage student protest outcomes in 
any environment. 200  The important questions, though, are whether these frameworks are 
199 Kischelt, for example, argued that post-WWII American society was encouraging of social movements and 
produced assimilative collection action strategies that integrated challengers into the conventional political 
arena, thus giving them a political voice. (see Amenta and Young, “Democratic States and Social Movements”, 
154).
200
 The probability of other nations having similar socio-political and educational environments is high because 
European models of higher education were exported to their colonies. For example, the Mexican model of 
present and, if so, whether there are any other external factors not present in Mexico, Québec 
or California that might take precedence. For example, as previously mentioned, external 
factors such as state repression and internal factors such as the goals of the movement also 
have a great influence.
 In fact, there are a host of unexamined institutional determinants of student protest 
outcomes that were not comparable in this study. For example, the geographic location of 
universities influences movement potential, as rural locations have less access to political 
institutions and large populations. General cultural and social differences such as respect for 
politicians and activists, levels of deference to authority, and definitions of what constitutes a 
political issue might also come into play.201 These unexplored factors represent avenues for 
possible future research.
However, perhaps the most influential factor excluded from this study was the role of 
public opinion and media coverage. Unfortunately, this variable could not be studied 
thoroughly without conducting an in-depth content analysis of the news articles, speeches 
and manifestos published during the protests, a task which must also be reserved for future 
researchers. Nevertheless, public opinion was an important variable identified by political 
process theory, because public support provides student protestors with moral 
encouragement, increases opportunities for them to form outside alliances, and decreases 
chances for university or government authorities to repress their movement.202 Furthermore, 
higher education derives from the Mediterranean model of Spain and Portugal and thus is similar to that of 
other Latin American countries. The Canadian and American higher education systems both stemmed from 
the British model and thus share features such as “institutional autonomy in appointing staff and selecting 
students and a commitment to general, even classical, education for future public administrators” with 
countries as diverse as India, Jamaica and Ghana. (see Clark, The Higher Education System, 227-228).
201
 As these factors all theoretically influence the number of protestors likely to join in political activism, and as 
each case did see extremely high levels of mobilisation for their respected contexts, these variables probably 
had little effect on the compared outcomes of the three cases. Therefore, the impact of these variables can be 
assumed to be controlled for in this study.
202
 For a more detailed description of how this public opinion influenced student protests in Mexico, India, 
Japan, and Columbia, see Bakke and Bakke, Campus Protest, 471.
public opinion is an important determinant of social movement outcomes in democratic states 
in particular because elected governments are responsible to their citizens. 203 Public support 
can thus make decision-makers more responsive to the protestors’ demands and greatly 
influence the effectiveness of their movements. Public opinion is often determined by media 
coverage, and media scholars such as Edward Herman and Benjamin Singer note the 
“enormous power” news media has over public opinion. By selecting sources, emphasising 
certain perspectives, choosing stories and framing issues, the news media can “[distort] the 
social reality perceived by individuals in a society, alter their standards of judgement and 
hence their frame of reference toward what is normal and expected in such a society.”204
Therefore, the amount and character of media coverage that student protests receive may 
influence their rates of success by swaying general opinion. It may also influence protest 
outcomes by either encouraging or discouraging potential student participants from joining a 
particular movement.
In some respects this study is also limited in its ability to explain student protests in 
Québec, Mexico and California. Because this study utilises an ahistorical methodology, 
comparing the institutional frameworks across countries but not across time, it does not take 
account of changes in these societies that may be altering the presence and pertinence of the 
variables examined. For example, Mexico and Canada have both been subscribing in recent 
years to the decentralisation of higher education, moving toward the privately-funded, 
consumer-based model advocated by the IMF, the WB, and NAFTA harmonisation efforts. 
Such changes may eventually alter the institutional frameworks that characterised these two 
countries at the time the protests occurred; already, universities founded in Mexico in the
203
 Guigni, “Was it Worth the Effort?”, 379.
204
 Singer, Benjamin D. “Violence, Protest, and War in Television News: The U.S. and Canada Compared”. The 
Public Opinion Quarterly. 34, no. 4. (Winter, 1970-1971), 616 and Edward Herman. “The Media’s Role in 
US Foreign Policy”. In The Myth of the Liberal Media. (New York: Peter Lang, 1999).
1990s are being been placed under state instead of federal supervision, and the private sector 
has expanded from 10% of national enrolment in 1980 to over 30% in 2000. Similarly, the 
provincial governments of British Colombia, Alberta and Ontario have announced measures 
to develop private universities with more autonomy and higher tuition rates.205
Despite these limitations, it is hoped that this study added to the literature on student 
protest by providing an example of how the outcomes of such movements can be analysed, 
and by providing an initial foray into the world of cross-national comparisons of such issues. 
It is also hoped that scholars of student protest and protestors themselves can utilise the 
findings of this study to better understand and plan their movements.
205
 Richardson and Kent, “Government Policies and Higher Education Performance,” 8.
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APPENDIX A: RESOURCE MOBILISATION VARIABLES
I. HYPOTHESES AND VARIABLES
Variable 1: University size
Hypothesis: Large university communities aid student protests
According to social movement theory, protests occurring at large universities should have 
a higher probability of success than those occurring in smaller locales because of the larger 
sources of human capital that are available in such settings. In fact, large populations are 
cited as an important criterion for all forms of insurgency, including revolutions as well as 
social movements.206
This hypothesis is supported by numerous scholars of student protest who cite empirical 
evidence demonstrating that student protest in the United States tends to take place at large-
scale institutions,207 as well as at institutions where there is a higher density of students.208 For 
example, Nella van Dyke found that large schools were twice as likely as small schools to 
have experienced significant student activism in the 1960s.209 This observation is partially 
explained by the higher absolute head-count of students at large universities that increases 
protest recruitment. It is also a result of the important presence of non-students and part-time 
students who live in the vicinity of large universities and who have more time resources than 
undergraduates and therefore participate more in protests. These individuals maintain ties to 
the college and form links between students and the outside world, thus increasing the 
potential external inflows of resources.
206 Jack A. Goldstone. “A Demographic/Structural Model of State Breakdown”. In Social Movements: Readings 
on Their Emergence, Mobilization, and Dynamics. Edited by Doug McAdam and David Snow. (Los Angeles: 
Roxbury Publishing Company, 1997), 5.
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 For example, private liberal arts colleges also have high incidences of student protest despite their small 
populations.
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 Van Dyke, Nella. “Hotbeds of Activism”. 212.
Variable 2: Time and money
Hypothesis: Affluence and free time aid student protests
Free time and financial resources are also emphasised by resource mobilisation 
scholars as prerequisites for successful protest: As William Gamson notes: 
“What is important about people is not their sentiments or the meanings they give 
the world, but whether they have discretionary time and money to spend on social 
movements. College students at elite schools have a lot of both, and, hence, form 
a central constituency for a number of different social movement industries.”210
In studies of student protest in particular, Bakke and Califano note the importance of 
financial support from other student or non-student groups and the fact that upper-middle-
class students are often at the forefront of the student protests.211 Needless-to-say, affluent 
students also have more time resources, as they are not obligated to support their studies with 
part-time jobs. Meanwhile, a 1969 study by the Urban Research Corporation found, rather 
unsurprisingly, that “the longer the protests, the more likely the protestors were to get 
demands granted.”212 This finding implies a relationship between time resources, financial 
resources and protest outcomes.
Affluence may not, however, be as direct a factor as these studies seem to suggest. In 
a study of locations of student protests in the United States, Nella van Dyke finds that 
economic resources do not directly explain high incidences of protest at elite schools. 
Instead, protest is more likely encouraged by the fact that faculty at selective schools tend to 
be more politically involved and students may be more likely to come from politically active 
and powerful families. These connections and alliances with outside elites constitute a form 
of political opportunity structure that is examined as a separate political process variable in 
this study.
210
 McCarthy, John D. and Mayer N. Zald. “Introduction”. In Social Movements in an Organizational Society: 
collected essays. Edited by Mayer N. Zald and John D. McCarthy. (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 
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II.  RESOURCE MOBILISATION FACTORS IN THREE INSTITUTIONAL 
FRAMEWORKS
Based on the three cases examined, it appears that resource mobilisation theories of 
student protest outcomes are only half accurate. While an education system with more free 
time does seem to provide more opportunities for sustained and successful student 
demonstrations, the affluence of protest participants does not appear to be an accurate
predictor of protest success. Furthermore, a highly and densely populated university 
environment may be a prerequisite of large-scale student protest, but student body size does 
not correlate directly to high rates of movement success.
The successful cases of student protest in Montréal and Mexico City did take place 
among the largest university communities of Québec and Mexico, respectively. In fact, with 
over 270,000 students, UNAM is the largest university in North America.213 In addition, over 
30,000 teachers and researchers and more than 31,000 administrative manual workers take 
part in Mexican university life. Because this population is divided among 38 UNAM 
campuses, student protestors simultaneously have access to the centres of political power in 
Mexico City as well as the ability to mobilise populations across the country. This 
geographic decentralisation also makes military and police containment of student protests 
more difficult. Although the number of alumni living in close proximity to one of UNAM 38 
campuses is impossible to estimate, it is clear that UNAM has an enormous population of 
individuals who could be mobilised to participate in a movement.
Similarly, with 160,000 university students in the greater metropolitan area, Montréal 
boasts the second largest number of students per capita of any city in North America. 214
213 Brian Pusser and Imanol Ordorika. “Bringing political theory to university governance,” 181.
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This evidence seems to support the prediction that large densities of students 
positively influence the success of student protests. However, the UC also has an extremely 
large student population and one of the most vital university communities in the United 
States, yet student protests there failed to save affirmative action policies. The UC awards 
over 27 thousand bachelor’s degrees and over 11 thousand advanced degrees every year.215
There are over 160,000 UC students, and almost as many university employees.216 And 
although this population is distributed among eleven campuses, it is clear that the UC is by 
no means lacking in population: in fact, as in Mexico the separate campuses might actually 
be a population plus factor for protestors, because each UC campus is surrounded by a 
satellite university community of individuals who are involved in university life. Neil 
Smelser described this process of community formation and mobilisation in his study of 
protest at Berkeley in the 1960’s:
Ecologically, the Berkeley campus is conducive to the mobilisation of mass protest. 
The south campus area has a population of indeterminate size, consisting of a shifting 
mixture of culturally alienated (bohemians, beatniks, hippies), politically active and 
transient youthful people. Readily mobilisable by pamphlet and word of mouth, this 
population has moved in and out of alliance with student activists depending on the 
issue at hand. Also available in times of crisis was a “gloating” group of easily 
mobilised people around the Bay Area, most from other campuses in the urban area, 
some from San Francisco’s enclaves of cultural and political alienation, and some 
from the student bodies of local high schools.217
It is therefore clear that the UC has a large, dense, and active university community 
that protestors can draw from and that all three cases support the hypothesis that population 
size influences student protest mobilisation. Quantitative analyses of university protest in the 
United States have already confirmed that all of the so-called “hotbeds” of student activism 
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are large universities located in large university communities;218 it seems then that this finding 
can be extended to cover international comparisons of student movements as well.
Nevertheless, as evidenced by the failure of the many marches and mass protests at 
the UC to influence the decision of the university’s Regents, the three case studies imply that 
population does not necessarily impact the outcomes of student movements. To be sure, a 
large population is a benefit for student protestors attempting to initiate societal change; a 
liberal arts college of 2,000 students is not going to change government policy even if 100 
per cent of the student population goes on strike, and it is notable that the two cases of 
successful student protests in Montréal and in Mexico City both took place among the single 
largest university communities of Québec and Mexico. However, the case of protest at the 
UC demonstrates that a large or densely populated student body is not sufficient to produce 
effective protests. This finding makes intuitive sense because if population were a 
determining factor then protest would never succeed at small colleges and would virtually 
always succeed at large ones: this is simply not the case. Therefore, the three case studies 
imply that population is not as important a determinant as resource mobilisation theory 
predicts. 
Furthermore, affluence also had an unclear influence on the three cases examined.  
First, affluence is primarily a function of the individual resources of protest participants, and 
as such data was never collected in any of the three cases, its effects are difficult to measure. 
However, it is likely that Van Dyke’s conclusion about the relative unimportance of 
affluence was correct: protestors in Québec and Mexico utilised less-costly tactics than 
students at the UC. Specifically, the principle differences were strikes by Québec and 
Mexican students, and legal action by Californian students.
218 Van Dyke, “Hotbeds of Activism,” 6.
The importance of free time seems to be supported by the cases examined, but again 
the time constraints experienced by students in the three different nations is difficult to 
compare. Like other American universities, the UC uses a cumulative GPA system where 
frequent examinations and assignments throughout the semester require students to commit 
themselves to constant studying. In contrast, student grades in Québec and Mexico depend 
far more on final exams, leaving students with more time during the semester to engage in 
other pursuits.
Furthermore, the pressure to graduate in a timely fashion is far more present at the 
UC. The UNAM and universities in Québec both have significantly high levels of part-time 
students enrolled in their programs. For example, at the Université du Québec à Montréal 
(UQAM), 31% of the total student population was part-time in Fall 2005, while 33% were 
part-time in the spring semester.219 While UNAM does not document the number of part-time 
students in attendance, in Mexico the practice of taking many years of part-time study is so 
common that long-term students who take light course-loads have acquired an affectionate 
sobriquet: they are referred to as “fossils” and are often noted to participate with higher 
frequency in student organisations. Because the cost of attending university is currently so 
low at UQAM and UNAM, it is normal for students to take more than the minimum four 
years to finish their undergraduate degree. In contrast, there are fewer students at the UC-
and in the American system in general- who do not take full course loads.
SUMMARY
This section examined the extent which the three variables generated from resource 
mobilisation literature facilitate student protests in the context of Québec, the United States 
and Mexico. It was found that variables relating to the size and affluence of universities and 
219 La population étudiante de l’UQAM: Statistiques d’inscription 2004-2005. (Montréal: Université du Québec 
à Montréal, August 2005), 14.
the student body are not reliable predictors of student protest outcomes, although populated 
university communities do see higher incidences of large protests overall. 
On the other hand, education systems that provide students with increased amounts of 
free time and less stressful academic and social environments do see increases in successful 
student protest. This is due in part to the fact that protest leaders can utilise this additional 
time to devote themselves to researching and planning strategies of activism.  Furthermore, a 
greater number of students are likely to participate in direct action events such as sit-ins, 
strikes, marches and rallies in environments where academic and social obligations are not 
constant. Finally, universities with relaxed academic schedules see greater incidences of 
successful protest because activism can be sustained for longer periods of time without 
interfering too irreversibly with the graduation plans of participants.
